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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between microfinance institutions and the poor in 
Beira-Mozambique and the benefits accruing from the established relationships. The study 
focuses on access to credit and the promotion of entrepreneurship among the target group. 
The study concludes that the institutions and the target group, especially active clients, 
treasure close long-term relationships and strive to build and sustain such relationships. 
However, the relationships have thus far had only a limited, albeit promising, impact on 
the sustainability of the institutions, access to credit and the promotion of entrepreneurship 
among the target group. Another major finding is that clients already in the credit 
relationship do not have serious problems accessing credit upon successful repayment of 
previous loans. However, those seeking to enter credit relationships face strict entry 
requirements. In short entering credit relationships is more difficult than staying in them. 
 
Key words: microfinance; micro-credit; relationship; sustainability; lending; poor access; 
entrepreneurship; lending technology 
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DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS AND TERMS 
Microfinance and micro-credit  
According to Shama (2001), microfinance refers to the provision of a broad range of 
financial services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers and insurance 
to the poor. van Bastelaer (2000) defines micro-credit refers to small amounts of money 
between USD$50 and USD$ 4000 lent to low income households for either consumption 
or investment, and formal micro-credit refers to money borrowed from registered 
institutions in the country in which they operate. In this paper microfinance refers to the 
financial services designed to fit the needs and capacity of low income households. The 
terms microfinance and micro-credit are often used interchangeably. 
 
Sustainability and institutional financial sustainability  
Sustainability refers to the ability of the microfinance institution or programme to serve a 
large number of the poor on a permanent basis while at least covering its operation costs. 
Institutional financial sustainability (IFS) refers to the ability of the lending institution to 
cover all its costs and make a profit (Littlefield, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
 
Relationship lending  
A relationship is defined as “the connection in the form of long-term close ties between a 
financial intermediary and a borrower that goes beyond the execution of simple, 
anonymous, financial transactions” (Nalukenge, 2003, p.8). Close, long-term relationships 
exhibit high levels of mutual consideration for each party’s success through a commitment 
by the lender to providing quality service at fair and sustainable terms, and the clients’ 
commitment to purchasing and repaying loans (Berger, et al., 2001). 
Access to credit 
Access refers to the ease with which clients can and are indeed entering credit relationships 
with lending institutions.  It is linked to institutions’ ability to devise target group friendly 
lending technologies and create demand through social mobilisation. Beck and da la Torre 
(2004) define access as multidimensional, covering issues such as: geographic access i.e. 
the extent to which potential clients can reach the lenders’ offices or branches 
conveniently, at a reasonable cost and in a reasonable time; socioeconomic access, which 
involves the costs, the fees and the confidence to enter credit relationships (p.2). 
 
The poor  
In this study the concepts poor, target group and low income microentrepreneurs are used 
interchangeably to refer to individuals or households that lack a socially acceptable amount 
of money and/or material possessions and socio-economic opportunities to enter credit 
relationships with traditional banks, are credit constrained and have the potential to 
improve on their condition given enough financial, technical and moral support.   
 x 
 
 
 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship refers to the ability of the target group to prudently invest loans to 
generate more money and improve their own situation (Cunningham and Lischeron, 1991). 
 
Lending technology 
Lending technology refers to; 
The entire range of activities carried out by a credit granting institution which have 
to do with selecting borrowers, determining the type of loan to be granted, the loan 
amount and maturity and the way in which it is to be secured, as well as the 
monitoring and recovery of loans (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994, p.106).
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Formal microfinance has grown in importance in the last few decades as a result of its 
verified potential for meeting the financial needs of poor households and micro-enterprises. 
Researchers have identified the lack of money to grow or diversify income generating 
activities and smoothing consumption as one of the greatest challenges facing poor 
households and micro-enterprises (Schreiner, 1999; Littlefield et al., 2003; Pagura, 2003). 
For these reasons, microfinance is regarded as one of the most powerful tools for fighting 
poverty and social deprivation (Morduch and Haley, 2002; Sylla, 2005). Despite this 
recognition, the considerably high demand for credit, and the proved bankability of the 
poor (Rhyne, 1998), access to credit is still far from satisfactory.  Robinson (2001) 
estimates that, “about 90% of developing world’s population does not have access to 
microfinance institutions” (p.96).  
 
The problem of access to credit by the poor has been, by and large, attributed to lending 
technologies that fail to solve information related problems- adverse selection and moral 
hazard-, and contract enforcement problems in dealing with the target group. These 
technologies often resemble the traditional banking practices that base their lending on 
hard information- financial statements and traditionally acceptable collateral e.g. houses 
and land titles (Boot, 2000) - and have high levels of red tape (Ongena and Smith, 1998).  
 
Modern financial intermediation theory regards the use of unconventional lending 
technologies built around close long-term relationships between lenders and micro-
entrepreneurs as promising alternatives for militating against lending related risks, and 
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improving access to credit to the target group (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994, 1995; Ongena and Smith, 1998, 2001). One of the most celebrated lending 
technologies is called relationship lending (Berger and Udell, 2002, 2005). The feasibility 
of this technology, it is argued, depends on the ability of both lenders and clients to take 
each other’s concerns on board and ensure that they both gain from the relationship 
(Berger et al, 2001).  
 
Client-lender relationships are established through several practices and mechanisms, 
which include but are not limited to: The location of branch offices near the target group to 
facilitate continued contact; the adoption of marketing strategies such as personal selling 
which allow close interactions between the lenders and the target group; provision of 
quality services tailored to the individual needs of the target group and/or individual 
members of the target group on a recurrent basis; progressive lending which implies the 
issuing of small initial loans which increase as the relationship between the lender and the 
borrower matures; the provision of services other than financial e.g. counselling, mentoring 
and training; and occasional meetings between lenders and clients to discuss their credit 
relationship and related issues.  
 
It is worth noting that much of the relationship building responsibility lies with the lenders, 
since their survival depends on the borrowers’ capacity and willingness to repay the loans. 
This explains why, it is the lenders’ rules that dominate the relationship. Nonetheless, the 
borrowers’ contributions for the establishment of the relationships are indispensable. 
Borrowers’ contributions include: The continued purchasing of the products offered by the 
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lenders, referrals1, and loyalty in terms of keeping to the terms and conditions established 
in the credit agreement, such as timely repayment. 
 
Close long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders can be beneficial to both 
parties. Lenders gain substantial amounts of information needed for making credit 
decisions and enforcing contracts, hence reducing risk related costs (Berger and Udell, 
2002). Furthermore, in relationship lending, bureaucratic procedures associated with 
verification of documents and collateral requirements are reduced, implying a reduction in 
costs for both lenders and borrowers (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004).  Lenders can gain 
from the sustainability and reputation point of view, while borrowers can gain greater 
access to credit and other financial services that enhance the growth and development of 
their micro-enterprises and consequently their wellbeing (Cole, 1998). 
 
1.2 Overview of the study 
1.2.1 Aims of the study 
This study examines whether formal microfinance institutions and the poor (target 
group/low-income micro-entrepreneurs) in Beira-Mozambique take each others’ concerns 
on board as the institutions strive to sell their products and attain financial sustainability 
and profits on the one hand, and the poor on the other hand endeavour to have access to 
financial products, particularly credit.  
 
The study specifically aims to examine whether in dealing with the poor, the institutions 
invest in keeping as close as possible to the target group both in physical and emotional 
                                                 
1 Referrals have to do with clients advising and recommending other clients to join in credit programmes 
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terms by locating branch offices in neighbourhoods where the poor commonly live, while 
providing them with financial education, incentives and moral support to enable them to 
enter and stay in credit relationships.   
 
In the same vein, the study examines whether the poor take their credit responsibilities, 
such as repayment, seriously and understand that good repayment behaviour is 
instrumental for the survival of the institutions and their own (the target group’s) continued 
access to credit. Furthermore, the study examines whether the relationships established 
between the institutions and the poor are one-off or long-term relationships and whether 
the parties are satisfied with one another- the clients with the terms, conditions, and 
services offered by the institutions; the institutions with the borrowing, investment and 
repayment behaviours of their clients.   The study also examines the benefits accruing from 
the established relationships, with a focus on access, sustainability and the promotion of 
entrepreneurship among the target group. The study focuses on one product – micro-credit.  
 
1.2.2 Research question 
What kind of relationship has been established between formal microfinance institutions 
and the poor (target group) in Beira Mozambique?  
1.2.3 Rationale 
Despite the increasing use of relationships in lending worldwide, with the intuition of 
making credit more accessible to the poor, there is hardly any research on the nature and 
role of client-lender relationships in micro lending in Mozambique. Furthermore, 
international research on issues such as the impact of close long-term relationships 
between clients and lenders on interest rates and loan guarantees remain largely 
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inconclusive, with different empirical studies showing different results; hence the 
researcher’s interest in finding out what actually happens in the context of Beira-
Mozambique, where no such research had been done before. With this study the researcher 
hopes to make a modest contribution to relationship lending theory. 
 
1.2.4 Findings 
The study concludes that the institutions and the target group, especially active clients, 
value high close relationships and invest time and effort to build and sustain such 
relationships. These relationships are mainly characterised by personalised and quality 
service, repeat borrowing and a commitment to repayment.  
 
However, the relationships have thus far had a limited, albeit promising, impact on the 
sustainability of the institutions, access to credit and entrepreneurship among the target 
group. In general, a small number, mainly comprising relatively well-off households and 
micro-entrepreneurs benefit from easy and repeated access to credit and manage to develop 
their micro-businesses thanks to the established relationships. The majority of the low-
income households and survivalist micro-entrepreneurs find it difficult to meet the 
requirements for entering credit relationships and as such are left out of the formal credit 
market. It is, however, important to note that those who have access to the microfinance 
institutions would hardly qualify for credit with traditional commercial banks; as such the 
contribution of these institutions in expanding financial services to the poor is noteworthy.   
 
The reasons for the limited impact of the relationship on sustainability, access and 
entrepreneurship include: (i) the relatively young age of the lending institutions, i.e. five 
(5) years; (ii) high operational costs; (iii) the macroeconomic environment, including 
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limited profit opportunities resulting from low per capita incomes, limited markets and a 
lack of adequate infrastructure. Despite all these challenges, the efforts made by both 
institutions to relate to the target group and provide them with credit are promising and 
praiseworthy, so is the cooperation of those among the target group who are actually in 
credit relationships with the two institutions. It is clear, however, that relationship lending 
is not a panacea, and cannot, by itself, overcome the challenges of poverty in Mozambique. 
 
1.3 Country overview:  Mozambique 
Mozambique has a surface area of 799,380 sq. km and is home to 19,686,505 people, about 
seventy percent (70%) of whom live below the poverty line (CIA-The Word Fact Book: 
June, 2006). Mozambique was a Portuguese colony for about five hundred (500) years. In 
1975 it gained independence from Portugal under the leadership of FRELIMO (The Front 
for the Liberation of Mozambique) who took over power and established a one-party 
Marxist state. Between 1976 and 1992 the country was embroiled in a civil war with 
RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) fighting the FRELIMO led government. In 
1989 Marxism was abandoned and in 1990 a new constitution based on economic and 
political liberalisation came into being (Fraser and Candido, 2001).  
 
In 1994, 1999 and 2004 multi-party elections were held for the presidency and parliament, 
FRELIMO won the elections in all instances (Dalglish and Bradley, 2006). At present, 
Mozambique is considered an example of a politically stable country emerging from a 
prolonged and devastating civil war (Fraser and Candido, 2001). 
 
The sovereign state of Mozambique inherited a declining economy at independence, due to 
the prolonged years of the struggle for independence (1962-1974), the sudden withdrawal 
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of the Portuguese accompanied by high levels of sabotage (Dalglish and Bradley, 2006), 
losses of revenue resulting from a prolonged civil war (1977-1992), the failure of 
government’s Marxist policies of planned economy and its dedication to the liberation of 
other African counties particularly its undivided support for the struggle for independence 
in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and against apartheid in South Africa, which led to 
systematic destabilisation by both the Southern Rhodesian and the Apartheid regimes. This 
destabilisation included support for RENAMO during the civil war (de Vletter, 999; Fraser 
and Candido, 2001). 
 
Efforts were made in the 1990s to improve the socioeconomic situation in Mozambique 
and considerable gains were made. Peace agreements were made to end the civil war 
which effectively ended in 1992. With the end of the war and the begging of the fall of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa, the stage was set for change in Mozambique, and the 
opportunity was well taken. After a series of economic rehabilitation programmes- 
Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP) and Economic and Social Rehabilitation 
Programme (ESRP) of 1989-1990, macroeconomic stability was re-established in 1996, 
(EIU 2000; Fraser and Candido, 2001, p.24).  
 
However, in early 2000 floods devastated most of the country and affected the economy 
adversely (Dalglish and Bradley 2006). But improvements were back on course two years 
afterwards.  At present, economic performance is considered impressive. The World Bank 
and the IMF believe that Mozambique has now entered a period of macroeconomic 
stability and sustained economic expansion. The 2005 estimate of the GDP growth rate is 
put at seven percent (CIA: World Fact Book, 2006). Nonetheless, Mozambique remains 
one of the poorest and most aid dependent countries in the world (World Bank, 2006). 
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1.3.1 The city of Beira 
Beira, where the research was carried out, is the provincial capital of the central province 
of Sofala. It is Mozambique’s second largest city and port. It is home to about six hundred 
thousand (600 000) inhabitants.  During the atrocious seventeen year civil war the province 
of Sofala suffered the most. Today, it has the reputation of being Mozambique’s poorest 
province (RoZ, 2003).  
 
As an economy, Beira is struggling: “physical infrastructure is broken and its people 
appear to have few opportunities to progress” (Dalglish and Bradley, 2006, p.3). Among 
the many challenges facing the people, the government and the entrepreneurs of Sofala 
include dealing with “low levels of literacy and educational standards, high levels of 
unemployment, low productivity of households, weak development of infrastructure, 
bureaucratized government, corruption and a very high mortality rate from curable 
diseases” (Dalglish and Bradley, 2006, p.3). 
 
1.4 Microfinance in Mozambique 
In the 1990’s microfinance activities intensified in Mozambique. During that period, 
sustainability was not a major consideration. Financing mostly took the form of grants, and 
was based more on volume and spread than on financial viability and permanence.  The 
institutions were mostly short-term NGO projects, which were dependent on subsidies and 
operated in an unregulated environment (Fraser and Candido, 2001). Repayment and loan 
recovery rates were catastrophically low, hence their limited albeit important contribution 
to improving the welfare of the poor who had limited sources of credit (de Vletter, 1999). 
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In 1998 the Bank of Mozambique issued a decree (47/98) to regulate microfinance activity. 
This decree allowed all institutions and individuals registered under the decree to provide 
credit but not to capture savings, i.e. people could only borrow from the institutions but not 
deposit any money except repayments. This was probably because the institutions were not 
big and organised enough to ensure their permanency and consequently the security of the 
savers. As the sector grew and the regulatory framework improved, the institutions were 
allowed to provide other services including savings, issues of best practice started gaining 
ground and sustainability became an important issue, and more institutions entered the 
sector (Fraser and Candido, 2001).  
 
The minimalist approaches to lending, which pay particular attention to sustainability 
through focusing on loan recovery and cost recovery pricing, gained prominence. Today, 
microfinance institutions are more advanced in terms of institutional structures, ownership 
and sustainability relative to NGO credit projects and state run development banks such as 
Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BDP) which dominated the sector in the 1990’s 
(Fraser and Candido, 2001).  
 
Despite the progress made so far in the development of the microfinance industry in 
Mozambique and the demand for microfinance products by the majority of the poor, the 
emerging formal sector does not yet reach the majority of the poor, especially the poorest 
of the poor, since the institutions largely targeted low risk clients (Athmer and Hunguana, 
2004). Only fifty-thousand2 clients are served by the industry as a whole out of an 
estimated, eight hundred thousand people who could benefit from Microfinance credit 
services alone (Opportunity International, 2005). Therefore, much more needs to be done if 
                                                 
2 The basis on which these figures have been established are not indicated in the source , which makes it 
difficult to establish the extent of their reliability . 
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the industry is to have any real impact on poverty alleviation. Lenders have to take more 
risk and come up with innovative lending methods that allow those with no collateral, 
business experience etc., to enter credit programmes without of course leading to high 
levels of indebtedness among the poor and bankruptcy among lenders. 
 
In Beira, where the study was conducted, there are more than thirty thousand potential 
clients but less than ten thousand have access to formal credit3. Poverty in the region is 
acute and it will require more than microfinance to overcome it. It would in fact be helpful 
for the expansion of microfinance if poverty could be reduced through other means as 
poverty itself is a major constraint on access to microfinance. How this could be achieved 
in a global environment in which most people overlook poverty as a constraining factor to 
access to credit requires further and thorough research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The numbers are estimations provide by Mr. Boris senior officer of institution A  no basis for these 
estimations were provided. 
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2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The study was carried out using qualitative research methods. Traditionally used in social 
sciences, qualitative research aims to investigate and understand human behaviour within a 
given context. It is more descriptive than definitive (Brusky and Fortuna, 2002). 
Qualitative research does not deal with statistical measurements or proportions, but rather 
behaviours and attitudes. Data collected in a qualitative study enables the researcher to, not 
only identify tendencies but more importantly, to understand the motivations behind the 
behaviours, habits or attitudes that create these tendencies. With it, the researcher gets a 
holistic picture of the object under study (Kane, et al., 2001). 
 
For this particular study, the method facilitated the examination of the nature of the 
relationship established between the MFIs and the poor. The views and the experiences of 
the actors, which are central to the study, were substantially captured and used for 
understanding the nature of the relationship and the inherent benefits to both lenders and 
borrowers. This was achieved through interviews with clients, both potential and active, 
senior officers and loan officers. Both primary and secondary sources were used for 
gathering the data necessary for this research. Secondary sources used include books, 
annual reports of relevant microfinance institutions, journals, working papers, World Bank 
and United Nations literature and government information, including information from 
other relevant organizations. Primary data was collected using semi-structured interviews.  
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2.1 Sample and Sampling 
To explore the nature of the relationship between formal microfinance institutions and the 
poor in Beira, thirty one (31) respondents were interviewed. Twenty (20) clients, from two 
formal micro-credit institutions, involved in small to very small businesses in both the 
formal and informal markets in the city; five (5) potential clients4; four (4) loan officers, 
two (2) from each institution,  and two (2) senior officers, one from each institution. The 
first four (4) respondents were selected randomly from the two large markets in the centre 
of the city of Beira, one formal and the other informal. For the remaining sixteen (16) the 
snowball technique was used to identify and interview them. This means that the sixteen 
(16) respondents were referred to by the first four (4) respondents.  
 
2.2 Method of data collection 
The researcher carried out all the interviews with the key respondents himself. The 
interviews were semi-structured and took a minimum of forty-five (45) minutes each, with 
some taking a bit more than (60) minutes. Semi-structured interviews allowed a thorough 
interaction with the interviewees. They were mainly informal and flexible, allowing the 
conversations to flow and a broad range of information to be collected. The dialogical 
nature of semi-structured interviews gave the process of information seeking an important 
edge, consistent with Huysamen (2001)’s observation that, “…semi-structured interviews 
allow the interviewer to use probes with a view to clearing up vague responses, or to ask 
for incomplete answers to be elaborated on” (p.160). It is this strength inherent in semi-
structured interviews which influenced the selection of this instrument, the objective of 
which was to maximise information gathering. 
                                                 
4 Potential clients refer to those among the target group who may qualify to enter credit programmes but are 
not in nay credit programme 
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In each interview there was scope to explore issues of particular interest which arose in the 
course of the conversation. They allowed contact with people who possessed the 
information sought. The contact, in its turn, was important because the interviewer could 
get additional information from the interviewee from gestures or facial expressions which 
can not be obtained otherwise. Key to its effectiveness were the efforts made to focus on 
particular subjects and to ensure that the conversation did not stray on to irrelevant 
information. This was not easy given that interviews tended to say more of what they 
wanted to say and less of what the interviewer wanted to hear, nonetheless with patience 
and waiting the interviewees came to the point. 
 
One of the main challenges faced by the research during data collection is related to the 
time consuming nature of interviews, some interviewees were reluctant to spend much 
time being interviewed. After pleading with them for the interviews they finally agreed to 
brief, albeit not rushed interviews that took 45 minutes on average, with some lasting a 
little more than 60 minutes. 
 
2.3 The selection of the case study  
The study is a case study of the city of Beira. The choice of city was informed by the 
researcher’s need for convenient access to key respondents since the researcher lives in this 
city. The advantage was that the researcher incurred very few expenses and saved on time, 
the two critical constraints anticipated in the research. Furthermore, and in fact more 
importantly, the city is located in one of the provinces most notorious for poverty and as 
such it provided an excellent opportunity to examine the relationship between the poor and 
formal microfinance institutions.  
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In order to facilitate the examination of the relationship and the benefits thereof from both 
the clients’ and institutions’ perspectives, two (2) institutions, which are treated in the 
paper as institution A and B, were selected on the basis that they are among the largest 
institutions in the country and the city itself. Each of the two institutions has operations in 
several cities in Mozambique. It is worth noting that it was not the purpose of this study to 
assess the general performance of the institutions but simply to establish the kind of 
relationship established between MFIs and the poor. The use of the case studies simply 
provided a broad picture of the operation of the institutions, the approach and lending 
technology used, the financial situation, levels of outreach, the general behaviour of the 
clients and the established relationships.  
 
Moreover the use of such case studies enabled the researcher access to important key 
respondents within these institutions. The researcher was, therefore, able to acquire in-
depth knowledge and understating of the lending technologies and the inherent 
relationships more effectively. This provided the researcher with substantial background 
information and facilitated the examination of the nature of the relationships. The identities 
of the institutions and the respondents have been kept confidential, at the request of most 
interviewees. For the sake of consistency all the names of the interviews used in this paper 
are pseudonyms.  
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2.4 Data analysis 
Straus and Corbin (1990, in: Maykut and Morehouse, 1994, p.122) describe three 
approaches to analysing qualitative data. The first approach, they compare with the work 
of a journalist in which the data is presented without any analysis. The goal being to let the 
research participants speak for themselves as much as possible. The second approach 
involves an attempt by the researcher to accurately describe what she or he has understood 
by reconstructing the data into recognisable reality for the people who have participated. 
This approach requires some selection and interpretations of the data and the research has 
to weave descriptions, field note quotations and their own interpretations into a rich 
believable descriptive narrative. The third approach is theory building. This requires the 
highest level of interpretation and abstraction from the data in order to arrive at the 
organising concept and tenets of a theory to explain the phenomena of interest (Maykut 
and Morehouse, 1994, p.122).   
 
The data analysis approach used for this research lies between the first and the second 
approaches, with a bias for the later. Interview transcripts and notes from the observation 
of credit analysis undertaken by loan officers with active and potential clients were 
analysed periodically using a number of thematic headings. Quotations that captured 
commonly made arguments or observations in a succinct manner were selected. Quotations 
from respondents that represented deviant cases were also highlighted and selected. As the 
data was sorted, patterns, themes and categories were identified. This sorting facilitated the 
analysis of the data and the drawing of research conclusions. Throughout the analysis the 
researcher’s evaluation and judgment of information gathered, was employed.  
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2.5 Ethical considerations 
Ethical issues, such as voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity and 
confidentiality, were privileged in this research, consistent with de Vans (2001). The 
participants were given full information of the reasons for the research and their role in it. 
They were further assured that all the information collected from them would be strictly 
used for the purpose of the research and nothing else. Most interviewees requested that 
their identities be kept anonymous and for the sake of consistency all names mentioned in 
this report are pseudonyms.  
2.6 Outline of the Report 
Chapter I introduces the study. Chapter II presents the methodology used for the study. 
Chapter III is a review of the relevant literature. Chapter IV presents an analysis of the 
profile and the lending technology employed by the two institutions with reference to 
client lender relationships. Chapter V presents an examination of the nature of the 
relationship established between the two institutions and their clients. Chapter VI examines 
the benefits accruing from the established relationship. Chapter VII presents the 
concluding remarks. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature on microfinance in Mozambique focuses mainly on the evolution of 
microfinance in post-conflict Mozambique, from relief programmes to formal financial 
intermediaries and the industry’s poverty outreach and impact5.  Consequently the 
researcher did not find any literature dealing with the relationship between formal financial 
institutions and clients in Mozambique. In this regard, this study differs substantially from 
the studies done in Mozambique to date, in that it particularly explores client lender 
relationships, something no other study has done in Mozambique. 
 
Internationally, however, there is a large body of literature on client lender relationships 
which focuses particularly on the importance and the benefits or lack of benefits accruing 
from such relationships. These studies hardly focus on exploring the ways in which the 
relationships are built. Again this study differs slightly from many of these studies in that it 
focuses on the nature of existing relationships, how they are built and sustained. It 
additionally looks at the benefits or lack off accruing from the established relationships. 
 
3.1 The non-conventional lending technology 
Recent financial intermediation literature on lending to micro, small and medium 
enterprises show that commercial lenders can successfully reach the target group by 
drawing on non-conventional lending technologies in extending credit to these enterprises 
(Berger and Udell, 2005; Kano et al., 2006). The non-conventional lending technology 
                                                 
5 See de Vletter, 1999, 2001; Fraser and Candido, 2001, Fraser and Bne Saad 2003; Athmer and Hunguana, 
2004 
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described as relationship lending is perceived to be appropriate for lending to low income 
individuals and small business that often do not have standard financial records and 
conventionally acceptable guarantees such as houses and land titles (Boot, 2000).   
 
The lending technology is based on what Berger and Udell (2002, 2005) call ‘soft 
information’.  Soft information includes the character, reliability and estimates of the cash 
flows of the applicants; the information is acquired by loan officers through contact with 
the entrepreneur and the local community over time. In the case of BancoSol and the 
Grameen Bank that value strong long-term relationships with their clients, several 
mechanisms are used to build such relationships. Among the mechanisms used are: 
Meeting with clients regularly through periodic meetings or/and regular site visits, issuing 
small initial loans which increase as the client borrows repeatedly, frequent repayment  
schedules, encouraging borrowers to become savers and in the specific case of the 
Grameen Bank borrowers become shareholders (Navajas, 1999).  
 
As a result of repeated contact with the target group, the loan officers (institutions) develop 
quasi-personal relationships with them, which makes it ease to elicit the information 
needed for establishing borrower creditworthiness and providing them with products, 
services and the support borrowers need to succeed in the credit relationship (Navajas, 
1999; Berger and Udell, 2005).  
 
The development of quasi-personal relationships of a long-term nature between lenders 
and clients does not only help lenders respond adequately to the needs and situations of 
their clients but can also foster client loyalty to the lender. This loyalty is vital for the 
growth of loan and borrower portfolios, for lowering the costs of provision, enhancing 
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repayment performance and profitability of the business for the lender (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Dunn, 2002; Elyasiani, 2004).  
 
3.1.1 Organisational structure 
Lending based on relationships is complex given that soft information is difficult to 
document and transfer to others. This inherent complexity requires lenders to develop 
organisational structures that facilitate the development and sustenance of strong long-term 
relationships with clients while ensuring accountability of staff (Kano, 2006). A more 
flexible and decentralized organizational structure is often considered more appropriate, 
because information obtained from relationships is often unquantifiable and difficult to 
communicate through a rigid hierarchical and centralised structure typical of traditional 
banks (Berger and Udell, 2002).  
 
Therefore, institutions that base their lending on close long-term relationships with their 
clients need to have decentralised and flexible organisational structures. One of the most 
important innovations in this regard is making loan officers responsible for specific clients. 
In this regard, Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994) state that under relationship lending, “… 
[usually] a single loan officer is responsible for the entire loan-granting process as well as 
its relationship with the client after disbursement of the funds” (p.129).  
 
The rationale behind making a loan officer responsible for the entire life cycle of the loan 
is “that the loan officer has the most personal contact with borrowers and the people 
around the borrowers and is in a better position to observe the enterprise and household 
financial conditions” (Berger and Udell, 2002,  p. 8). The loan officer is therefore the most 
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important link between the institution and the client hence the need for the loan officer to 
have some degree of discretion and influence on loan decisions.  
 
3.1.2 Reducing agency problems between loan officers and top 
management 
With a great deal of power delegated to the loan officer in relationship lending, the 
institutions need to put in place mechanisms to monitor the loan officer to avoid agency 
problems between top management and the loan officers (Berger and Udell, 2002).  
Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994) argue for the need for a standardised credit analysis forms 
that ensure objectivity of the data collected by the loan officers; and that the approval or 
rejection decision is taken, at the last instance, by a credit committee. They further argue 
that performance based pay or incentives “calculated using criteria which include the 
delinquency and default rate are critical for ensuring loan officers’ objectivity and support 
for applications based on solid economic considerations rather than staff members' 
personal wishes or preferences” (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994, p.130). 
 
3.2 Risk and delinquency management 
3.2.1 Thorough initial screening 
Lenders often subject applicants to thorough initial screening processes, which are critical 
for reducing the probability of adverse selection and moral hazard and above all for 
ensuring that once in the actual credit relationship the clients can actually stay in it without 
harming others and themselves by failing to repay their loans (Ledgerwood, 2001; Beck 
and de la Torre, 2004; Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994). In establishing the credit worthiness 
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of an applicant, loan officers collect the necessary data from both the business premises 
and the home of the applicant, since in dealing with the target group it is difficult to draw a 
clear distinction between investment and consumption.  
 
In order to ensure that borrowers can repay their loans even if their business is not doing 
well, lenders usually grant loan sizes which are below the overall income of the particular 
client. In so doing, they reduce the risk to the institution (Ledgerwood, 2001; Beck and de 
la Torre, 2004; Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994). One can however argue that giving smaller 
sizes than clients ask for can actually increase the risk of default because the loan may not 
be enough for making a profitable investment, leading to the failure on the part of the 
client to get enough returns to manage repayment. 
 
Furthermore, a thorough initial screening is important for the development and 
maintenance of strong lasting relationships between the client and the lenders because it 
ensures that only clients with potential and the ability to sustain long-term credit 
relationships, enter credit programmes; this kind of precaution is often responsible for low 
levels of outreach. Lenders should be ready to take a little more risk when dealing with the 
poor. Otherwise they will end up reaching only a small number of the poor by excluding 
most of whom may only appear to be bad risk. Some could indeed be good risk clients 
provided they get enough moral support and mentoring. 
 
Professor Yunus’ initiative of encouraging every one of his 12 000 employees in 2004 to 
include a beggar in their pool of clients (Mainsah et al. 2004) could be adapted by other 
institutions to include at least one customer who does not meet the requirements of 
entering credit relationships (such as collateral) but have some potential to use the money 
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productively. This kind of practice will help lenders expand their outreach and have greater 
social impact, which is in fact the professed mission of the microfinance industry. 
 
3.2.2 Progressive lending 
Progressive lending entails issuing small initial loans which increase with subsequent 
applications. It “has the unique advantage of testing the borrower with small loans, 
allowing lenders to develop relationships in time and sort out potential defaulters before 
the loan scale is expanded” (Ghosh and Ray, 1996, p.493).  The effectiveness of 
progressive lending as a risk management tool and as an incentive to repay is “enhanced by 
promising to extend steadily larger loans over time to good customers, because typically 
borrowers desire larger and larger loans, the promised increases enhance the borrowers’ 
loss from being cut off” (Schmitz and Zeitinger, 1994, p.123).  
 
3.2.3 Regular repayment schedules 
Regular repayment schedules and short terms to maturity not only show that the 
institutions are serious about repayment but also help screen out undisciplined borrowers, 
as well as providing the microfinance institutions with a steady flow of information on 
client behaviour (Sanjay and Mansuri, 2003). This information can provide loan officers 
with early warning about emerging problems and make it possible for appropriate action to 
be taken promptly, in so doing reducing the risk for the lender.  
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3.2.4 Collateral  
Collateral has traditionally been used to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard (Brau 
and Woller, 2004).  It serves to discourage bad risk clients from taking loans which they 
know they are not capable of repaying (Krahnen, 2000). This allows the lender to avoid 
attracting a pool of clients who can not sustain long-term credit relationships. Asking 
clients to pledge collateral does not only help lenders establish borrowers’ credit 
worthiness, but also prevents irresponsible use of borrowed money (moral hazard) due to 
knowledge that collateral will be forfeited in the event of default (Ghosh et al., 2000).  
 
In relationship lending collateral is also used for the purposed elucidated above. The 
difference between relationship lenders and conventional lenders, in as far as requiring 
collateral is concerned, lie on the range of goods acceptable as collateral. While 
conventional lenders usually accept property or goods with a high salvage value, like 
houses, factory machinery and the like, relationship lenders will accept almost anything 
that the poor can afford to pledge as long as there is proof the clients value the goods. This 
includes inventory, household furniture and appliances, which have a low resale value but 
are highly esteemed by the owners (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994).  
 
Critics will, correctly, argue that requiring collateral in relationship lending contradicts the 
principles of  relationship lending and reflects the more traditional lending practices which 
are known for excluding most of the poor from credit markets. It is, however, worth noting 
that lending institutions, especially those that employ the individual lending technology6, 
can hardly afford to issue collateral free loans because collateral serves as a powerful 
                                                 
6 Individual lending technology refers to the practice of giving loans to individual borrowers who are 
responsible for the repayment. It is different from group lending where the group as a whole is responsible 
for the repayment of every group member 
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incentive for borrowers to repay loans. Increasingly, though, “institutions provide credit to 
the poor on the basis of social collateral through which borrowers’ reputation or the 
social networks to which they belong take the place of collateral” (Navajas, 1999, p.2). 
 
Institutions that employ the group lending technology, such as the Grameen bank, often 
use social collateral7  to replace physical collateral8 and indeed this helps much poorer 
people have access to credit markets. In these situations clients capitalise, not only on 
client lender relationships, but also on inter-client relationships which have the added 
benefit of increasing the social network of the clients, this is important considering 
networking is an important risk management mechanism for the poor (van Bastelaer, 2000; 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2000). Furthermore, in the case of group lending, clients stand to 
gain the multiple advantages of not having to pledge physical collateral, as well as being 
associated with a reliable lender, and expanding their social networks.  
 
It is worth noting though that group lending has its own problems. For example, defaulters 
and bad risk clients can suffer perpetual exclusion and group members can pay for the 
transgressions of others (ibid). Furthermore, building-up and managing groups is costly, 
time consuming and tedious. As a result such microfinance institutions as BancoSol of 
Bolivia are increasingly resorting to individual lending for which collateral is one of the 
most effective ways of securing loans de (Aghion, B. A., and Morduch J., 2000).  
 
                                                 
7 Allegiance to the group or community, fear to lose trust and exclusion 
8 Physical goods such as business premises, household utensils given as guarantee for loans 
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3.2.5 Above market interest rates 
High or above market interest rates9 are charged in order to cover operational and 
administrative costs, and to ensure the sustainability of the lender (Littlefield, et al., 2003; 
Littlefield, 2004). Additionally they have a screening effect. They compel borrowers to 
take loans on the basis of expected returns and not in order to take advantage of subsidies 
(Brau and Woller, 2004). Put in Hulme and Mosley’s (1996) words, “financially 
sustainable institutions have high interest rates that serve as an automatic screener for 
borrowers with projects with low rates of return” (p.32). Again charging above market 
rates ensures that only clients who are willing and can sustain long-term credit 
relationships enter the relationship hence increasing its quality.   
 
It is, however, important to ensure that interest rates do not overburden the clients. If the 
loans are too costly, potential clients do not enter into relationships or exit the relationship 
shortly after entering into it. Worse still, the likelihood of default will increase with the 
cost of credit (Pagura, 2003).  
 
3.2.6 Frequent monitoring  
Frequent monitoring of borrowers is one way to prevent risks of default. Monitoring, not 
necessarily to check on the use to which funds are put, but mainly to check on whether 
there are changes in the borrower risk profile, is an important risk management tool. It 
helps lenders detect problems or changes in the risk profile early enough to take prompt 
corrective action (Norell, 2001). This monitoring is often done through site visits, both 
planned and spontaneous. 
 
                                                 
9 Market rates refers to official Interest rates charged in a particular market 
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3.2.7 Practical action against defaulting  
Taking practical, fair and transparent action against defaults such as seizing the collateral 
pledged for the loans after all grace periods are over is used to underscore the institutions 
seriousness with repayment, hence discouraging borrowers from defaulting as a result of a 
simple unwillingness to repay (Churchill, 2000). In cases where signs of defaulting or 
actual defaulting take place, institutions should react promptly by paying a visit to the 
borrower. Depending on the reasons for the default, appropriate measures should then be 
taken. The quick response to arrears demonstrates the seriousness of the institutions’ 
commitment to recovering the loan, especially to strategic defaulting (simple reluctance to 
repay) (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994). This practice also enhances the maintenance of 
client lender relationships by encouraging clients to take their relationship responsibilities 
seriously. Excluding defaulters from access to future loans is also considered to be an 
effective mechanism for encouraging repayment in relationship lending (Schmidt and 
Zeitinger, 1994). 
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3.2.8 Traditional vs. non-traditional risk management mechanisms  
Although in relationship lending credit decisions are based primarily on the character and 
reliability of the clients, penalty and incentive mechanisms are used to make clients take 
their relationship responsibilities seriously (Churchill, 1999). In this regard, Churchill and 
Guérin (2005) argue, “regardless of the clients’ poverty level [and the strength of the 
relationship] if the lenders do not take repayments seriously clients will not either” (p. 10). 
As such, even in relationship lending risk and delinquency management mechanisms are 
important.  
 
It is true that the more traditional risk reducing mechanisms do indeed influence lending in 
relationship lending, although in a less intense way than in traditional lending. The risk 
reducing mechanisms employed by many microfinance institutions - including the two 
case study institutions - become more flexible when the borrower has established a good 
reputation the credit relationship between the client and the lending institution has existed 
for a time. In short, the mechanisms are often bent to favour more established clients, 
hence the importance of a strong relationship to the client. It is for example pointed out 
that, “In the case of BRI [Bank Rakyat Indonesia] a flexible definition of collateral gives 
staff a little leeway to increase loan sizes to reliable borrowers who may not be able to 
fully back loans with assets (Christen et al. 1995, p.29, in: Khawari, 2004, p.16).  
 
Furthermore, the physical collateral pledged in relationship lending has very little salvage 
value for the lender but sufficient personal value to borrowers who are expected to be 
unwilling to give it up, thus reinforcing their dedication to repay their loans. In the case of 
traditional lending and traditional risk reducing mechanisms, the collateral pledged has 
high salvage value to both the lender and the client.   
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Risk management mechanisms that resemble the more traditional mechanisms seem 
unavoidable in relationship lending. This is so because of the pressing need for lending 
institutions to deal with the problem of enforcing debt repayment and attain sustainability 
which is contingent on the ability of the institutions to reduce incidences of default. Put 
simply, Borrowers will usually not repay their debts if there are no incentives, positive or 
coercive, for them to do so (Churchill, 1999; Churchill and Guérin, 2005). As Reinke (no 
year) puts it,  
 
Extending credit to individuals without collateral and without group pressure 
exposes the lender to greater vulnerability towards free-riding opportunism. 
Therefore, sufficient safeguards need to be applied to aid the selection of 
appropriate candidates and to enforce their compliance with rules and obligations 
(p.10). 
 
Therefore, risk management mechanisms employed by microfinance institutions that use 
individual lending play an important part in helping institutions achieve high repayment 
rates. Of course such programmes tend to service much richer clients than those that use 
group lending (de Aghion and Morduch, 2000). 
 
One tried and tested way of providing loans to those who have no assets to pledge is joint 
liability or solidarity groups, a method mostly associated with the Grameen Bank. It is for 
example argued that “a large number of microfinance programmes-particularly those 
modelled on Grameen Bank are increasingly using group lending as an instrument that 
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helps reduce administration and monitoring costs, in addition to  effectively providing 
collateral in the form of social capita10l”( Mainsah et al. 2004, p.19). 
 
Group lending has its own problems. It is time consuming for both of borrowers and 
lenders. As such, assuming that borrowers value their time, group lending can be expensive 
for them. Furthermore, “the time consuming nature of interaction between borrowers and 
credit officers limits the number who can be served by a credit officer” (Reinke, no date, 
p.9). In this regard, lending to individuals can reduce the costs associated with building and 
sustaining group networks. However, lending to individuals compels lenders to resort to 
more traditional risk management instruments such as collateral which prevent most of the 
poor from entering credit markets.11 
 
An innovation which is increasingly being explored by BancoSol, for example, is 
combining both lending methods (Morduch, 1999). This provides clients with choice and 
helps institutions expand their borrower portfolios and include the very poor in their 
programmes considering that group lending is considered to be appropriate for poorer 
clients. Metrofund, another microfinance institution also combines individual and group 
lending. Frankiewicz (2001) points out the advantage of combining the two methods as he 
states that “By providing both products, Metrofund offered its clients a choice, and in 
many cases, a stepping stone for growth. Micro-entrepreneurs with no collateral, no co-
signers and/or a poor credit history could get them selves established with a group loan 
and later graduate to a one-on-one relationship with Metrofund through an individual 
loan” (p.44).  
                                                 
10 Social capital serves as collateral because group members are pressurised to repay their loans for fear of 
losing credibility from members of the society in which they live since their actions (failure to repay) affects 
other members of the group who have to foot the bills or be excluded from the credit programme. 
11 Collateral is considered in literature as one of the risk management instrument most responsible for 
keeping the poor out of credit markets, see Gonzalez-Vega et al. 1996; Khawari, 2004 
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One can therefore conclude that combining group and individual lending is important for 
tackling the tensions between relationship lending and the use of risk management 
mechanisms that reflect the more traditional mechanisms. Additional substitutes for 
collateral include frequent repayment schedules which serve as a monitoring tool 
(Frankiewicz, 2001). Others include “training requirements to credit rationing; some require 
that borrowers pledge savings as security; others tap local knowledge by requesting character 
certificates from local worthies who are compensated according to the performance of their flock” 
(Reinke, no date, p.10). 
 
3.3 Relationship building processes and dimensions 
There is no universally accepted method for measuring the presence and strength of 
relationships in lending. Researchers, nonetheless, generally concur that if lenders grant 
credit to a client based on soft data (the character, and reputation of the client) obtained 
through interactions over a certain period and through various products, the lending is 
based on a relationship, often described as close long-term relationship between the lender 
and the client (Bharath, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2005; Boot, 2000; Cole et al., 2004). 
Other measures include: geographic proximity, high levels of social mobilisation, personal 
selling, emphasis on frequent communication and transparency,- sustainability of the 
institutions resulting from high levels of client loyalty and repayment rates-, high quality 
service and client satisfaction, exclusivity and the intensity of transactions. Below some 
relationship measures are discussed in detail. 
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3.3.1 Geographic proximity 
Locating near the target group is considered a relationship proxy (Bharath, et al., 2004), for 
two main reasons: first, it gives clients (both potential and active), convenient access to the 
institution. This can serve as an incentive for the target group to enter and stay in 
relationships with the institutions. Second, loan officers can easily and cheaply visit 
potential clients to sell credit and other products, monitor loans and provide any technical 
assistance to needy clients, hence the closeness (Beck and da la Torre, 2004; Bharath, et 
al., 2004). Therefore locating branch officers near the homes and/or business premises of 
the target group is one important step in the establishment of client-lender relationship 
(ibid). 
 
3.3.2 Personal marketing 
The marketing strategy used by lenders is an important ingredient for building and 
sustaining client-lender relationships. Relationships often described as strong in the 
relationship lending literature are usually best described as personal (Wright, et al., 2003); 
as such a marketing strategy based on personal or one-to-one selling does not only serve to 
sell products and signal the lenders interest in building personal relationships with clients 
but also to give potential clients the confidence needed to enter credit relationships 
(Wright, et al., 2003).  
 
A marketing strategy that is heavily dependent on the media and entails no contact with the 
target group is most likely to imply a distant relationship and as such is unsuitable for 
advertising programmes that target the poor. Another relationship dimension related to 
marketing is when clients help market lenders by referring their acquaintances to the 
lenders. This is usually considered a relationship proxy, because clients will normally work 
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for the lender in cases when the lender and the client are closely related (Ongena and 
Smith, 1998; 2001).  
 
3.3.3 Transparency 
Transparency12 is both a prerequisite for the establishment of a strong and lasting 
relationship and a symptom of the existence of a strong relationship between the parties 
(Brusky and Fortuna, 2002). Institutions that exhibit high levels of transparency are more 
likely to win the loyalty of their clients hence the emergence of a strong relationship 
between the lenders and the clients (Brusky and Fortuna, 2002).  
 
Just as lenders need accurate information about the potential borrowers in order to 
established their creditworthiness and tailor products to their needs and capacity, potential 
clients need to understand very clearly the process of application and the costs and benefits 
thereof. Van Bastelaer (2000) argues that, “a critical element of programmes’ success is 
the existence of trust between borrowers and lenders, which is in large part created and 
maintained by predictable and transparent applications of the lender’s rules” (p.18). For 
this reason, high levels of transparency are used as relationship proxies.  
 
3.3.4 Progressive lending 
In addition to being a risk management mechanism, progressive lending is an effective 
mechanism for building and sustaining relationships in lending to micro and small 
businesses. When institutions start by granting small loans to their clients with the promise 
of larger loans in the future, provided the clients have a good repayment performance, 
                                                 
12 Here transparency refers to clarity and fairness in the rules and practices of the institutions. 
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repetitive borrowing is certain to take place considering that there is high demand for credit 
among the poor. When this happens, a long-term relationship between the intuitions and 
the clients is sure to be built and sustained. Therefore, through this risk management 
strategy, relationship building is enhanced. Both the institutions and the clients get to 
known each other better and as such become long-term relations (Pagura, 2003). 
 
3.3.5 Frequent repayment schedules 
Frequent repayment schedules help build and sustain relationships in micro lending. When 
clients have to make repayments frequently they engage in repetitive contact with the 
lender as they visit the branch office to make the payment or when loan officers visit the 
clients to collect repayments. This means that the lender gets to know the clients over time. 
In this way, long-term personalised relationships are established through repeated client-
lender contact. Client loyalty and commitment to repay are fostered and risk is minimised 
at the same time a relationships grow in both quality and longevity (de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2000).  
 
3.3.6 Frequent monitoring 
In micro lending, lenders often check on their clients to see whether there is any change in 
their risk profiles and to assist them whenever necessary. In addition to being a risk 
management tool as described earlier, frequent monitoring helps keep the lender and the 
client in constant contact hence helping build and consolidate client-lender relationships 
(Pagura, 2003).  
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3.3.7 Sustainability 
The sustainability of lenders or the prospect thereof, serves as an incentive for clients to 
enter long-term relationships with lenders and be serious about repayment. It is, for 
example, contended that “if there is no guarantee that the lending relationship is going to 
last or rather that it is going to come to an end in the near future the borrowers are more 
likely to have little or no incentive to repay” (Morduch, 1999, p.1583).  
 
Furthermore, sustainability can result from a good rapport between the lenders and clients 
which leads to greater client loyalty, retention and positive repayment behaviour 
(Churchill, 2000; Pagura, 2003). In this regard, sustainability is an incentive for clients to 
enter lasting relationships with lenders and can be suggestive of the existence of close 
long-term relationship between lenders and clients. In most cases, when the relationship is 
beneficial to both parties, especially to the clients, borrowers stay with the programme, and 
their attitudes may implicitly or explicitly draw more borrowers into credit relationships 
with lending institutions (Churchill and Halpern, 2001) hence lowering risks of default and 
expanding borrower and loan portfolios (Bharath, et al., 2004).  
 
3.3.8 The quality of service 
Institutions often strive for quality of products and services in order to attract and retain 
clients in the credit relationship. Finaciera Calpia in Rural EL Salvador, for example, offers 
loans tailored to individual demands of their clients, in so doing making it ease for them to 
take advantage of productive opportunities (Navajas, 1999). The quality of products 
offered and how they are offered are used as relationship proxies; with highly personalised 
services resulting in the establishment of strong personal relationships on the one hand and 
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indicating the existence of close long-term relationships between clients and lenders on the 
other (Churchill, 2000).  
 
Quality of services and fair terms and conditions are both prerequisites and an indication of 
the existence of strong relationship between clients and lenders. This includes fair pricing, 
realistic guarantee requirements, repayment schedules and terms to maturity (Pagura, 
2003). Wood (1975), argues that “the current quality of loans extended affects the strength 
of future demand” (in: Ongena and Smith, 1998, p.11).  
 
3.3.9 Positive incentives 
Flexible ex-ante and ex-post contracting is instrumental for relationship building and 
sustenance (Ongena and Smith, 1998). In relationship lending, relationships are also built 
through giving clients incentives such as tax rebates, repayment holidays, loans with 
improved terms and conditions to well performing clients. The kind of treatment borrowers 
receive particularly in times of crisis is an important mechanism for building and 
sustaining close long-term relationship between the client and the lender. When clients are 
treated well and are rewarded for their good conduct they are more likely to be loyal and 
stay in the credit programme.  
 
3.3.10 Exclusivity 
One way that institutions build and maintain relationships with their clients is by 
attempting to become the sole provider of services, particularly loans (Berger, et al., 2001). 
This is attained by either providing services of higher quality and more flexible terms and 
conditions than competitors, or denying access to people with credit relationships with 
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other institutions. Normally, providing clients with better services and more flexible terms 
and conditions is the most used method for ensuring that clients stick to one institution.  
The idea is that clients satisfied with the institutions tend to be voluntarily loyal to that 
institution and purchase products exclusively from the particular institutions. When this 
happens it can be said that there exists a strong bond between the institution and the clients 
(Churchill, 2000; Churchill and Halpern, 2001). 
 
3.3.11 Duration of transitions 
A clear manifestation of permanence on the part of the lender is important for the 
establishment of strong client lender relationships of a long-term nature. Clients will most 
likely opt to enter a strong relationship with an institution that promises to be around and at 
the service of their clients for a long period of time. Therefore, the length of time an 
institution has provided and/or is willing to provide services to customers, and the duration 
and frequency with which clients purchase products from a particular lender, features in 
the literature along side scope (number of products sold or bought by a given client) as the 
two most important relationship measures (Ongena and Smith, 1998). 
 
The longer the period and the more frequent the purchases the stronger the relationship 
(Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). A prior transaction between the 
lender and the client is also used a proxy (Dahiya et al., 2003; Schenone, 2004). This is 
consistent with the idea that a relationship starts when a client purchases a product the first 
time from the lender (Bharath, et al., 2004), and more so with the idea that the more 
beneficial the relationship is to both parties the longer they stay with each other (Pagura, 
2003).  
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3.3.12 Scope of transactions 
Scope or breadth of transactions refers to the number of products the particular lender 
provides to a client (Ongena and Smith 1998). The number of products or services lenders 
provide to particular clients is considered to be a determinant as well as a product of strong 
relationships (Cole, 1998). This signals the existence of mutual trust between the two 
parties. Clients purchase a broad range of services from the particular institution as a result 
of satisfaction with and loyalty to the institution, especially, in a competitive market 
(Churchill, 2000). By providing multiple services to a particular client, both the lender and 
the client get to know each other better and get involved in long-term relationships that 
may go beyond just credit to include savings, payment of utility bills and technical support 
(Degryse and Cayseele, 2000).  
 
3.4 The importance of close long-term relationships  
3.4.1 Benefits to the lender 
The most celebrated benefit of close long-term relationships between lenders and clients is 
that such relationships help lenders market themselves and acquire information over time 
through direct contact with the potential borrowers and the community (Bharath, 2004) and 
use this information in their decisions about the availability of credit to the clients and the 
terms and conditions thereof (Degryse and Ongena, 2000; Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 
2004).  By developing a relationship with clients over time the lender can assess its clients 
profile and increase the precision of its risk estimation and as such minimise losses from 
default (Mishkin, 2004). 
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Strong client-lender relationships help foster demand and client loyalty to the institution 
(Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Cole, 1998). They help the clients develop the confidence 
and skills for entering credit relationships and increase the precision with which lenders 
respond to the needs of the clients and consequently sales and repayment rates increase 
(Churchill, 1999; 2000; Bharath, 2004).  
 
Strong client-lender relationships have been associated with a reduction in the costs of 
providing credit to the target group (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). The time and paper work 
needed for dealing with clients who have established relationships is reduced hence the 
reduction of lending and borrowing costs. Furthermore, the relationships “can improve the 
monitoring of collateral…may render feasible for the bank to make loans that would not be 
profitable from a short-term perspective but may become profitable if the relationship with 
the borrower lasts long enough” (Ferri et al., 2001, p.6). 
 
Strong client-lender relationships can help lenders retain clients and further enhance 
sustainability because, 
Typically, retained customers are the ones with extensive credit history and who are 
accessing larger, higher value loans; whereas new customers require induction 
training…MFIs typically break even on a customer only after the fourth or fifth loan 
(Wright, 1997, p.2). 
 
Furthermore, the relationships can help lenders expand their outreach with reduced risks. 
When clients are satisfied with the services of the institutions and the relationship 
established between them, they not only stick to the programme but spread word in their 
communities about the lenders and encourage their peers to join in, especially if they feel 
they are getting a good deal from a serious institution committed to serving the community 
in the long-term (Gonzalez-Vega, et al., 1996). When this happens, borrower portfolio 
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increases and institutions take advantage of economies of scale and attain cost 
effectiveness and sustainability (Cole et al., 2004).  
 
3.4.2 Benefits to clients - both potential and active 
Close relationships between lenders and the target group can help draw risk averse clients 
who would otherwise benefit from micro loans into credit relationships with formal 
institutions. This is particularly important considering that, “…although individuals are 
better judges of their situations, the fears [of failure] may be more about confidence than 
reality” (Hashemi et al., 2006, p.1). The importance of relationships in helping deal with  
lack of confidence or risk aversion is also emphasised by Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2005) 
who contend that, “…relationship measures are most important in increasing the 
probability of applying for a loan …” (p.3).  
 
Close long-term relationships are often associated with larger loan sizes (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 2002). In micro-lending, loan sizes are often small, not 
because borrowers do not want large loans but because lenders are not certain about the 
client’s capacity and willingness to repay (Ghosh and Ray, 1996). As such, lenders would 
rather issue small loans in the beginning, and, as the relationship between them matures, 
larger loans are issued (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Berger and Udell, 2005); So, clients who 
stay longer and take more than one loan benefit from larger loans. 
 
Strong long-term relationships between clients and lenders affect repayment cycles and 
terms to maturity. In micro-lending, repayment is often as frequent as weekly or biweekly 
and terms to maturity short, especially at the early stages of the credit relationship 
(Ledgerwood, 2001; Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994). However, as the client demonstrates 
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loyalty through punctual repayment over a period of time, in which case the reputation and 
ability of the client to repay and a relationship is established, repayment tends to be less 
frequent, and terms to maturity become longer (Berger and Udell, 1995, 2002; Schmidt and 
Zeitinger, 1994).   
 
Client-lender relationships are associated with interest rates, albeit in an inconclusive 
relationship. Some argue that borrowers with longer relationships with lenders pay lower 
rates as the relationship matures (Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot and Thakor, 1994). Others 
contend that relationships have no bearing on interest rates (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2005). Yet others contend that interest rates in fact increase 
with the duration of the relationship (Ferri et al., 2001; Sharp, 1990; Degryse and Cayseele, 
2000).  Interest rates are only a fraction of the total costs of borrowing. Other costs arise 
from the steps required to secure a loan. Strong long-term relationships are said to lead to 
increased simplicity and reduced red tape in lending and in so doing reduce costs to both 
borrowers and lenders (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996; Ongena and Smith, 1998).  
 
The relationship between collateral and strong client-lender relationships is also 
inconclusive.  Boot and Thakor (1994) argue that the duration of a bank-borrower 
relationship has effects on collateral. They argue that borrowers pledge collateral in the 
early stages of the relationship, and do not need to pledge collateral later on (Berger and 
Udell, 1992, 1995; Boot and Thakor, 994).  It is, however, also argued that collateral is still 
pledged when long-term relationships exist (Sharpe, 1990). More important, however, is 
the fact that strong relationships help lenders monitor the collateral pledged more easily 
than when the lender and the clients are distant both physically and ‘emotionally’ (Boot, 
2000). This is important, bearing in mind that if the collateral - which initially has little 
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resale value - can not be monitored, borrowers may further depreciate it through misuse, 
making it even more difficult for lenders to extend credit to the target group (Boot, 2000).   
 
Ex-post contract negotiations are connected with strong client-lender relationships. It is 
argued that in the presence of strong relationships clients benefit from the possibility of 
renegotiating terms and conditions and refinancing in times of crisis especially when 
arrears result from factors beyond the borrower’s control (Ferri, et al., 2001).  Lenders 
retain these options in credit programmes in order to build a reputation of being strict but 
fair (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994).  
 
Clients have quicker and greater access to credit when they are engaged in a relationship 
with lenders. Put in Chakravarty and Yilmazer’s (2005) words, “…relationship measures 
are most important in increasing the probability of applying for a loan and lowering the 
probability of being rejected for a loan” (p.3). When institutions can relatively easily 
obtain information about the potential clients through a close long-term relationship with 
the target group, they can more readily screen and identify good risk borrowers, provide 
credit, and monitor them (Berger and Udell 1995). When this happens more and more 
people can be drawn into the credit relationship (Streb, et al., 2002). Moreover, 
improvements in loan terms and conditions resulting from relationship often mean lower-
cost credit to the target group, hence an increase in access (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 
1995). 
It is, therefore, evident from the literature that, generally, both clients and lenders stand to 
benefit from close long-terms relationships. However, Sharp (1990) and Rauterkus (2005) 
also show that relationships may not always be beneficial in that lenders may hold up 
clients and extract excessive rents from this capture, in the form of high interest rates 
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charged later in the relationship when the client is already intimately involved with the 
institutions (Nalukenge, 2003). Furthermore, clients may, due to the hold up problem, fail 
to take advantage of the services of intermediaries with better terms and conditions 
(Thakor, 2000); this is particularly so in less competitive markets.  
 
On the other hand, lenders may invest in establishing strong bonds with the clients by 
making concessions such as charging lower interest rates and fee exemptions in the early 
stages of the relationship with the hope of getting compensation as the relationship 
matures, only to see the clients drop out before such compensation is attained (Ongena and 
Smith, 2000). Additionally the realisation by clients that terms and conditions can be 
renegotiated ex-post may induce them to irresponsible conduct13 (Ferri et al., 2001).  
 
 
In sum, the literature reviewed in the ambit of this research shows that financial 
intermediaries that deal with the target group are increasingly, at least in principle, 
depending on the establishment of close long-term relationships with their target group in 
order to reduce asymmetric information and contract enforcement problems that have 
traditionally adversely affected lending to the poor. The clients on the other hand depend 
on such relationships to gain greater access to credit and other services they can hardly get 
from traditional commercial lenders. 
 
It is worth noting though that close long-term relationships are not panaceas to problems 
that affect financial markets especially those dealing with the target group. As such, most 
of the features of traditional lending e.g. requiring borrowers to pledge collateral are still 
evident in relationship lending. The conclusion drawn therefore is that lending to the target 
                                                 
13 Such as deliberately missing a repayment date 
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group has not yet been fully done based on relationships alone or in the main, and lenders 
are still risk averse. The result is the limited outreach reported worldwide and high 
proportions of the poor not yet served by the formal microfinance industry. 
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4. PROFILE OF THE CASE STUDY INSTITUTIONS AND 
ANALYSIS OF THE LENDING TECHNOLOGY THEY 
EMPLOY VIS À VIS CLIENT LENDER RELATIONSHIPS 
 
In this chapter, a brief profile of the case study institutions A and B and the lending 
technology they employ are presented and discussed.  The two institutions have similar 
missions and employ a similar lending technology, with minor differences. The differences 
do not affect the study in any significant way if overlooked; therefore their profiles and the 
lending technologies are jointly presented and discussed.  
 
4.1 Profile of the Institutions  
The two institutions are regulated private microfinance institutions in operation for just 
over six (6) years. Their mission is to provide financial services to micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, and to ensure sustainable returns on their investments to 
shareholders.  
 
They operate in urban areas and are strategically located near both the homes and business 
premises of the target group. They are located within walking distances of some of the 
largest informal markets and low-income neighbourhoods in the city of Beira.  The 
strategic location of the branches of both institutions results from the acknowledgement 
that locating near the target group is convenient for both the institutions and the target 
group. This is consistent with Beck and de la Torre, (2004) and Bharath, et al., (2004) who 
consider geographic proximity as an important aspect in microfinance, since it makes it 
easy for both lenders and clients to access each other, and in so doing save a great deal of 
time and money that would have been used for transport, especially in cases where the 
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lender and the client can actually walk to one another14.   
 
The institutions employ the commercial approach to lending, use the non-conventional 
lending technology based on individual lending and offer a range of loans to micro-
entrepreneurs, salaried workers, and SMEs- which include start up and working capital, 
consumer and house loans. Institution B has focused on credit alone for five (5) of the six 
(6) years of its operation as a regulated microfinance institution. The other has been 
offering a range of products that includes loans, accounts- including, current, cheque, term 
deposit and savings accounts-, and services such as Western Union services, payment of 
utility bills and foreign currency exchange.15 
 
The institutions depend on investments from their owners (shareholders), revenues from 
their operations and loans from other banks for their operations. They charge interest rates 
in the range of six percent (6%) and six point five percent (6.5%) a month and five percent 
(5%) fees for all successful applications.16 The financial indicators of institutions A are not 
up to standard. Despite gains in the number of clients, high repayment rates and levels of 
operational self-sufficiency, profit margins have been negative throughout except for the 
year 2004.17 Various reasons have been given for this, they include: the macroeconomic 
environment, inflation and exchange rate fluctuations in the country which affect the 
institution because most of its debts are paid in USD yet their business in the country is 
done in the local currency18. However, growing borrower and loan portfolios and ninety-
                                                 
14 Client interviewed in the ambit of the research have repeatedly highlighted this advantage. The research 
confirms the distances having undertaken some interview at the homes of the respondents 
15 This information was given by the management of the institutions and can be found in the annual reports of 
the institutions 
16 From these figures we get a nominal annual rate of 78%. These rates are very high when considering that 
the market interest rates charged by commercial banks in Mozambique is in the range of 25 % per annum.  
17 see appendix II 
18 Interview with Boris senior officer for institution A 
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seven percent (97%) repayment rates, show that the institution has a promising future19. 
Institution B has generally done well, although with some oscillations; it has had positive 
profit margins and default rates below three percent (3%) since the year 2000, surprisingly 
it is the institution with fewer products and less  clients than the other.20  
 
The two institutions have registered gains in terms of outreach since they began operations. 
They have registered an expansion in their borrower portfolios. As of the year ending 2005 
they jointly served twenty-two thousand nine hundred and sixty four (22, 964) clients 
countrywide.21  Overall, the number of clients served by these institutions in Beira is small; 
out of an estimated thirty-thousand (30 000) potential clients22 and several more credit 
constrained people, less than ten thousand (10 000) have access to formal credit, with the  
two institutions jointly serving just over five thousand (5000) clients23.   
 
4.1.1 The clients 
Most of the micro-loan clients of the two institutions are micro-entrepreneurs, mainly self-
employed. They largely operate within the informal economy, and the majority are 
involved in various forms of trading, varying from market vending, tailoring, carpentry, 
tin-smithing, baking, bicycle repairing, general dealing, hair dressing. These clients usually 
use the loans for working capital and sometimes to diversify their activities by starting new 
ventures, although loans are primarily given for financing existing businesses.24  
                                                 
19 see appendices I and II 
20 appendices I and II 
21 see appendices I and III 
22 These figures are estimates provided by one respondent from within the institutions. They coincided with 
the estimates provided by a respondent from the other institutions. Unfortunately non-of the respondents 
provided the basis for the figures hence putting their reliability in question. 
23 The number is obtained from the records of each institution in their Beira branches,  Institutions A has the 
bigger number  2.956, institution B 1. 983 clients (these are 2005 figures) 
24 Reflected by the requirement that applicant must have a business than has been running for at least 12 
months 
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The management of both institutions describe their clientele as belonging to low-income 
segments of the Mozambican society. A few factors attest to this claim; these include: high 
incidences of loans below USD$300 and average loan balances of less than USD$90025. 
Furthermore, the near fifty percent (50%) average number of women borrowers can also 
serve as an indicator of reaching the poor, especially considering that women have 
traditionally suffered deep and prolonged social and economic deprivation and are still 
considered to constitute the majority of the poor. UNDP (1999) reported that seventy 
percent (70%) of the 1.3 billion people living on less than a dollar a day are women. As 
such the greater the number of women in borrower portfolios the more it is said that the 
lender is reaching the poor.  
 
However, considering that there is a considerable number of women who are relatively 
well off, especially in urban settings, and that the institutions could be serving such women 
more than the poor, using the number of women in borrower portfolios as a proxy for 
poverty outreach is questionable; unless actual poverty assessments of the women involved 
proves that they are in fact poor. 
 
On the same note, although the clientele served by the two institutions, belongs to the low-
income26 segment of the Mozambican society they are the relatively better-off in the 
broader category of the poor27. They tend to belong to households that can meet their daily 
needs, have access to primary education and basic health services, and have some assets. 
They enjoy relatively stable incomes, have more diverse sources of income and are well 
connected with suppliers, especially shop owners. This allows them to manage repayment 
                                                 
25 see appendices I and III 
26 Going by the overage loan sizes which are relatively low; See appendices I and III 
27 Considering the entry requirements collateral and 12 months business experience 
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even when faced with small crises. However, most of them hardly qualify for credit with 
traditional commercial banks, since they generally run very small business with no ‘hard 
information’ i.e. financial records and traditionally bankable collateral (houses and land 
titles).  For this reason, they resort to either microfinance institutions or informal money 
lenders.28  
 
4.1.2 Entry requirements 
To be eligible for loans, applicants are required to be at least 21 years of age, have a 
running and successful micro business for at least twelve (12) months, have a good 
reputation in the community, and have no arrears with other institutions. Required 
documents include: identity card or a passport or proof of application for the identity card 
and proof of residence.  
 
Respondents consider the overall eligibility criteria to be reasonable, however, the co-
signer and the 12 months business experience requirements are the two most unpopular 
requirements, followed by collateral which not only bars many from entering credit 
relationships but also limits the loan sizes for those who qualify. This is especially the case 
as they have to be able to pledge collateral worth 120% of the loan they are granted.  
 
Respondents claim that it is difficult to convince people to be co-signers; and that the 
twelve (12) months business experience is too much. Respondents from within the 
institutions have, however, said that these requirements are flexible and that individual 
situations are taken into consideration. For example, when the applicant has a potentially 
profitable venture and is of high repute in the community, credit granting decisions can be 
                                                 
28 Interview with Luisa, Loan officer for institution B 
 - 49 - 
 
made in their favour even in the absence of some of the requirements29. On the whole, 
however, these requirements prevent most credit constrained people from accessing credit, 
despite the fact that on the surface they may appear to be within the reach of the majority 
of the credit constrained poor30.  
 
4.2 The lending technology used by the two institutions 
The lending technology used by the two case study institutions is a copycat of the non-
conventional lending technology, also called relationship lending, known to hinge on 
strong long-term client- lender relationships. Loan granting decisions are, to a large extent, 
based on what Berger and Udell (2002) call “soft information” which includes estimates of 
the income of the applicants, their character and reliability. Loans are secured through non-
traditional collateral, co-signers, and other mechanisms, including: small initial loans, 
frequent monitoring and repayment cycles31.   
 
4.2.1 Organisational structure 
Consistent with relationship lending literature (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002) and the non-
conventional lending technology employed by the two institutions, the organisational 
structure of both the institutions allows loan officers some deal of authority and discretion; 
they bear full responsibility for the institutions’ relationship with the clients throughout the 
entire life of the loans; including analysis and screening, disbursement, monitoring and 
enforcement and repayment.  Loan officers are, therefore, recruited and trained on the basis 
of both the technical skills required to manage loan portfolios and the public relations skills 
                                                 
29 Loan officers of both institutions  
30 65% of the respondents have said that the entry requirements especially collateral and co-signers are 
responsible for keeping most of the poor out of credit programmes 
31 This information was provided by loan officers and the management of both institutions 
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necessary for recruiting and motivating borrowers, and for managing the inherent 
relationships.32  
 
Although the loan officers have a great deal of discretion when it comes to granting and 
renegotiating loans, they are accountable to and are monitored by a credit committee which 
takes most of the final decisions after taking into account the recommendations of the loan 
officer33. Furthermore, the credit analysis they undertake is largely standardised, and the 
decision about whether or not the loan application will be approved is taken in the last 
instance by a credit committee to which the loan officer has to present and justify the data 
collected from the credit analysis and the recommendation for or against the application. 
This helps to make the data obtained more objective and also helps monitor the actions of 
the loan officers themselves34. Loan officers have performance bonuses which are in most 
cases higher than their base salaries. These serve as incentives for them to recommend 
clients on the basis of merit and not favouritism.35  
 
4.2.2 Marketing strategy  
The main marketing strategy used by the two institutions hinges on personal selling. It is 
through personal selling that institutions make initial contact with the target group. Loan 
officers go out in the field often in the markets and low-income neighbourhoods to create 
awareness among the target group about the institutions and the products and services they 
offer; large scale promotional campaigns are also carried out in the markets and 
                                                 
32 Interview with Carlos, senior officer of institution B 
33 Interview with Carlos, senior officer of institution B 
34 This is consistent with Navajas (1999) who highlights the importance of discipline and enforcement as 
requisites for the success of credit programmes based on reputation and credibility (p.16). See also Schmidt 
and Zeitinger (1994, p. 130). 
35 Interview with Carlos, senior officer of institution B. NB: The interview with Boris, senior officer of 
institution “A” shows that the two institutions have a similar practice 
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neighbourhoods around the city.36 The institutions are well known among the target group 
and have a reputation of serving poorer clients than those served by the traditional 
commercial banks37. 
 
4.2.3 The entry process   
The actual process begins when a potential client shows interest in taking loans with either 
one of the institutions. Interested individuals are advised to contact a loan officer of the 
relevant institution in the field or at the branch office where a loan officer is assigned to 
guide them through the application process. On the first contact for the discussions about 
the loan, the loan officer holds a serious but friendly talk with the prospective applicants. 
In the talk, the loan officer reiterates that the institution is a profit oriented institution 
which depends on the revenues from lending activities to continue in the business. They 
make it clear to the applicants that fees and interest rates are charged for all loans, and that 
they require clients to pledge collateral which will be seized if borrowers do not repay the 
loan.38  
 
They further explain to the potential applicants the necessity for establishing a reputation 
of punctual repayment for the sake of future access to credit, especially in time of 
emergency. In sum, the conversation emphasises the range of products offered, the 
simplicity of the process when potential clients cooperate by revealing truthful information 
and the benefits of having a long-term relationship with a permanent lender. Furthermore, 
the risks of default to both the institutions and the client are explained39. It is worth noting 
the loan officer’s emphasis on future credit transactions, which underscores the institutions 
                                                 
36 Information from loan officers of both institutions 
37 Information from clients and non-clients interviewed 
38 Information from the senior officers and loan officers from both institutions 
39 Information from management and loan officers of both institutions 
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interest in long-term relationships with the clients. 
 
In the next step, the loan officer asks the prospective applicant about the reasons for 
applying for the loan and asks questions related to the business and the household of the 
potential client. The applicants must be able to show that they have a successful business 
or one with the potential of becoming successful given the required injection of capital, 
and that they have alternative ways of repaying the loan in case the business fails or does 
not produce enough returns to meet repayment obligations; that they have enough 
household goods that can be used as collateral and that they have no delinquent loans 
elsewhere. Institutions have access to a list of reported defaulters produced by the central 
bank with the collaboration of formal lending institutions that have to report defaulters40. 
 
The information obtained from the talk is registered for a comparison with what the loan 
officer will find on site i.e. at the home and business premises of the applicant. This is 
considered an important element in the process of establishing the honesty and reliability 
of the potential client. Loan officers interviewed in the ambit of this report said that these 
talks are informal screening mechanisms and that normally about forty percent (40%) of 
would be applicants desist after the talk41. This is a considerably large number considering 
that at this stage the potential applicants have ruled themselves out and the institutions 
themselves will exclude many more when the actual credit analysis is carried out and the 
results are submitted to the credit committee. 
 
The high levels of premature dropouts before the institutions actually assess the potential 
clients  shows that many people wish to have credit relationships with formal lenders; it 
                                                 
40 Information from the senior officers of both institutions 
41 Interview with Miguel, loan officer for institutions A 
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also shows that the entry constraints are a bit high for the target group; it further shows that 
institutions are mindful of the risk of clients, hence the screening.   
 
When, after the initial credit talk between the loan officer and the potential applicant, the 
latter feels they stand a chance and the loan officer concurs, the next step is to undertake a 
credit analysis to establish the creditworthiness of the applicant. The loan officer obtains 
the data needed to carry out a comprehensive cash flow analysis by visiting the applicant’s 
business premises and household to understand the true nature of the prospective 
borrowers’ economic and social situation. The credit analysis focuses strongly on the 
prospective borrowers’ ability and capacity to repay, by striving to make a realistic 
calculation of the overall income and cash flows of prospective borrowers’ household and 
micro-enterprise42. 
 
The credit analysis is also aimed at determining the applicants’ character and personality to 
establish their willingness to repay. The consistency with which the borrower and the 
family explain and support their reasons for applying for a loan and the cash flow analysis 
carried out by the loan officer determine whether the application is accepted or rejected. 
Often other people close to the applicant are consulted, especially if they are active 
borrowers, about the character of the applicant43.   
 
A respondent underlined the importance of initial screening in the following terms, 
…if we do not get it right from the beginning we might be doomed. You know that 
everyone will be happy to get money from somebody else, especially from institutions, 
even when they know very well that they are not able to put it into productive use and 
generate enough returns to keep up with their repayment obligations; when we fail to 
                                                 
42 Interview with Miguel , loan officer for institution A 
43 ibid 
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screen these kinds of people in the beginning we face risks of default, which makes our 
business less profitable and not worth doing. For this reason we thoroughly screen 
applicants, in the beginning and throughout the life cycle of the loan44. 
 
In addition to helping establish the creditworthiness (ability and willingness of potential 
borrowers’ to repay loans) the credit analysis makes it possible to determine the potential 
credit needs of small and micro enterprises and match loan sizes, repayment cycles and 
amounts, and terms to maturity to the credit needs and repayment capacity of the borrower, 
thus preventing the borrower from being over or under funded which can lead to default. 
This was captured by a respondent in the following terms 
…our analysis also helps us understand the individual credit needs of the clients and the 
environment in which they do their businesses so that we match loan sizes, terms and 
conditions with their exact needs and capabilities45. 
 
It is therefore evident that credit analysis and screening processes play important roles in 
both the selection of clients and the identification of the specific needs of the clients. This 
is even more important when considering that meeting the specific needs of individual 
clients is important for fostering their loyalty to the lenders and as such ensure repayment. 
 
4.2.4 Loan granting and rejection process 
Once the credit analysis is concluded (in many cases it is concluded on the same day) the 
loan officer puts together all the necessary documents submitted by the applicant and the 
results from the credit analysis carried out by the loan officer and submits it together with 
recommendations to a committee which decides on whether to extend credit to the 
applicant or not. Normally the loan officer hands over the application file to the committee 
when the applicant meets the minimum prerequisites for qualifying for a loan.  
                                                 
44 Interview with Carlos, senior officer for institution B 
45 Interview with Rosa, loan officer for institution B 
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In cases where the applicant does not meet the requirements for eligibility the loan officer 
has the authority to turn down the application and explain the reasons for the decision and 
provide advice and encouragement to improve the application in the future. This is 
important because it gives them the hope of joining the institution someday and encourages 
them to work to this end. According to one loan officer,  
When an application is rejected we try to communicate the rejection in a friendly way often 
giving the responsibility for the rejection to the credit committee to avoid any personal 
hard feelings and make it easy for them to approach us in the future46. 
 
The transparency displayed by the lenders is impressive. Clients appreciate this because 
they enter a credit relationship knowing exactly what is expected of them and what they 
should expect from the institutions47. Qualifying applicants are contacted by the loan 
officer to be informed about the loan decision and the exact terms and conditions for the 
loan. They are given charts to show the payment plans available and the corresponding 
instalment amounts to choose from- how much they have to pay and when, what 
constitutes the principal, the interest and fee due dates, and the penalties involved in the 
case of default. They are also informed about the need to develop a reputation of using 
credit productively and punctual repayment in order to benefit from future credit 
opportunities at improved terms and conditions. The benefits include: quick disbursements, 
larger loans, longer terms to maturity, flexible repayment schedules, rescheduling and 
refinancing during crisis.  
 
When loans are granted, first time borrowers get smaller loans and it takes them a 
maximum of five (5) days for a disbursement to take place, especially when there is no 
prior relationship between the borrowers and the institutions.  First time borrowers with 
                                                 
46 Interview with Garicai, loan officer for institution A 
47 Interview with Wadzanai, client for institution A. NB: her assertion is seconded by all interviewees among 
the clients. 
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well maintained fixed or current accounts can have a decisions made in their favour in a 
maximum of three (3) days. Repeat borrowers with a reputation of timely repayments and 
well maintained accounts can have their loans granted in less than an hour48. This is 
consistent with the ideas of Dahiya et al., (2003); Schenone, (2004) and Chakravarty and 
Yilmazer, (2005), who say that the existence of a relationship prior to an application for a 
loan increases the chances of applicants to get a loan.  
 
4.3 Contract terms and conditions  
4.3.1 Loan sizes and repayment schedules 
Loan sizes vary from US$ 150 to US$ 4000. The decision on the amount of the loan is 
based not solely on the request made by the client but principally on the overall income of 
the applicant i.e. both the potential returns on the investment and the household income. 
Normally initial loans are small but eventually increase with subsequent applications, but 
the increase is often contingent on the capacity to repay as perceived by the institutions and 
the availability of corresponding collateral49. Loan sizes are a contentious issue. Borrowers 
want more than the institutions are prepared to give; sixty percent (60%) of the 
interviewees expressed this feeling. Thirty percent (30%) of the clients interviewed have 
said that they usually have to borrow from other people to top up in order to make new 
investments and diversify their sources of income or expand the existing enterprises.  
 
The lenders, however, acknowledge that the institutions are fair in their decisions because 
they demonstrate to the clients how they reach the amount they decide to give them and 
                                                 
48 Interview with Rose, loan officer for institution B 
49 Interviews with the senior officers and loan officers of both institutions reveal that both institutions have 
these requirements  
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that it is often enough for financing existing business but not for expanding them or 
exploring other opportunities50. The institutions acknowledge that disbursing larger loan 
amounts is beneficial to the institutions in terms of administrative costs. Nevertheless the 
institutions themselves are adamant that it would be unwise to give more than the cash 
flow analysis and the judgements of the officers and the committee conclude should be the 
right amount to grant. As a respondent put it  
we can not give larger loans on the basis of a relationship alone. The results of the credit 
analysis our loan officers undertake are important determinants of the size of the loan; 
coincidentally our clients improve their cash flows with their first few loans and often they 
get larger loans51.  
 
From this response it is clear that although relationships are important in credit decisions, 
the ability of clients to make profitable investments and increase their incomes are equally, 
if not more, important than the relationship alone. Therefore, those who have access to 
larger loans are those clients who progressively increase their incomes, and not necessarily 
those who have a close relationship with the institutions.  
 
The institutions make their disbursements to clients in one-off cash payments. Repayment 
is made on weekly, biweekly and monthly bases. Normally clients are given choices in 
terms of repayment cycles. This is especially true of repeat borrowers.  Terms to maturity 
range from four (4) to twenty four (24) months; they are normally kept as short as possible 
for first time borrowers52.  
 
Clients usually prefer small instalment repayments to extend over long periods rather than 
larger instalment with short terms to maturity, especially monthly repayments over a 
                                                 
50 This is generally the case with those clients who have weak assets base and as such do not have collateral 
valuable enough to get larger loans 
51 Interview with Carlos, senior officer institution B 
52 Interview with Luisa, loan officer for institution B 
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twenty-four (24) months period53. Clients have the choice to adjust their repayment plans 
from their initial choices; a price is often paid for these operations - especially if it means 
extending terms to maturity; it costs less to shorten the terms to maturity (when a client 
feels he/she wants to pay all dues before the loan is due)54.  
 
4.3.2 Collateral 
Collateral is required in all instances. Applicants must have property with an estimated 
value of 120% of the amount requested55. This is contrary to Boot and Thakor (1994) who 
associates the existence of a close long-term relationship with a decrease in the amount of 
collateral required. In fact, considering that the value of collateral required by the two 
institutions is a constant  120%, the value of the collateral pledged in real terms increases 
with the length of the relationship, given that in some instances the more the relationships 
lasts the higher the loan sizes. Consistent with Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994) and Krahnen 
(2000), assets that are acceptable as collateral include appliances and furniture, inventory, 
the business premise itself and anything that is valuable to the borrower but not necessarily 
to the institution56. 
 
It is worth noting that although assets required as collateral in the microfinance industry 
Krahnen (2000) are said to be generally within the reach of the target group (Schmidt and 
Zeitinger, 1994; Krahnen (2000), this is not quite the case in Beira, given the levels of 
poverty there. Just to illustrate, minimum wages for both public and private sectors are 
lower than USD$100 a month, the majority of the population lives in informal settlements 
with no electricity, piped water and other basic services. Even a salaried civil servant may 
                                                 
53 Interview with clients 
54 Interview with loan officers, information confirmed by clients especially those for institution A 
55 Interviews with management and loan officers 
56 Information from senior officers and loan officers. NB clients find collateral requirements constraining 
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not have a TV set or a refrigerator or anything that can be accepted even as non-traditional 
collateral. Therefore, collateral is a constraining requirement for most of the poor who 
would have wished to have access to credit.   
 
4.3.3 Fees and interest rates 
The institutions charge monthly interest rates of between 6 and 6.5% per month. Loans 
above 50000 MZM (USD$ 1940) pay between 0.25% and 0.5% less interest than those 
below this amount. Furthermore, all successful applicants pay a fee of 5% of the loan 
granted57. The rates charged by the institutions, are equivalent to annual nominal rates of 
up to 78%; they seem exorbitant compared with the market rate for Mozambique, which is 
at 25% per annum (BoM, Banco de Moçambique, 2006).  
 
However, financial intermediation theory considers these rates to be common in micro 
credit markets because the cost of supply is quite high and as such institutions charge high 
rates to cover these costs (CGAP, 2003). The rates charged in Mozambique are not far 
from those charged, in East Asia where nominal interest rates are said to be up to seventy 
(70%) percent, with effective rates being much higher due to commissions and fees 
(Fernando, 2006).  
 
Interestingly, fifty-five percent (55%) of the twenty (20) interviewees seemed unconcerned 
by the fact that interest rates are this high. Theory and previous empirical studies explain 
this seeming lack of concern with high interest rates as resulting from the target group’s 
preoccupation with quick and convenient access to credit (Ghosh and Ray, 1996, CGAP, 
2003).  
                                                 
57 Information from senior officers of the institutions 
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Although the majority of the interviewed seemed less concerned with the amount of 
interest rates paid, a substantial number, i.e. forty-five percent (45%) found it to be a bit 
too high. Seven (7) of the nine (9) respondents who seemed concerned by the far above 
market interest rates, run larger enterprises than the other two (2) and the eleven (11) of the 
respondents who seemed less concerned about the high interest rates. In addition to 
implying that the smaller the enterprise of the client the less concerned with the cost of 
credit the proprietor, these findings also show that interest rates do in fact matter for 
clients, the problem is that they can do little about them, especially because informal 
lenders charge annual interest rates well above 100%58. 
 
In banking, lending fees and interest rates constitute just a part of the total costs involved. 
There are other costs related with the bureaucratic exigencies which can increase the costs 
of borrowing. In the case of the two institutions transport costs, for example, are 
insignificant given the geographic proximity of the institutions to both the work place and 
homes of the clients. Most of the respondents are appreciative of the location of the 
institutions and confirmed that visits to the institutions cost them nothing in monetary 
terms and cost them very little time. When asked what they visited the institutions most 
for, one respondent, in common with 16 others, said,  
to deposit our takings mostly at the end of the day or any takings that are to high to be kept 
at the business premises because there are a lot of thieves here59. 
 
This respondent shows that clients not only purchase credit products but also use the 
savings facilities with their respective institutions.  This further shows that the institutions 
                                                 
58 This information was given by most of the clients and was confirmed by the management of the two case 
study institutions. 
59 Interview with Tatenda, client for institution A 
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and their clients are related beyond just credit but other services as well. With clients using 
the savings facility or products a long-term relationship between the lender and the clients 
is established. Furthermore, knowing that their money is kept in the bank, the client is 
more likely to behave in such a manner so as to ensure the longevity and sustainability of 
the bank lest they lose their savings. 
 
4.4 Risk and delinquency management 
Both institutions are conscious about the need to make sure that their lending practices do 
not lead to over indebtedness among the target group and as such to their failure to attain 
self-sufficiency and remain in operation. For this reason, several risk and delinquency 
mechanisms are employed by the institutions; these include but are not necessarily limited 
to: 
 
4.4.1 Thorough initial screening and communication 
As has been discussed earlier, the institutions start with a thorough screening process. 
Collateral, the requirement of a co-signer, frequent repayment schedules, interest rates and 
frequent monitoring are used as risk management tools, in the same manner described in 
the literature review chapter.  
 
The institutions also rely on open and frequent communication with the clients about the 
need to meet their repayment obligations. They emphasise the benefits of having a 
continuous access to credit, increasingly larger loans, and longer terms to maturity and 
greater choice in repayment plans. In cases of difficulties, clients are encouraged to report 
any difficulties that might lead to failure in repayment before the loan is due so that 
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contingency plans are jointly drawn by the clients and the loan officers60.   
 
4.4.2 Frequent monitoring 
Once applicants actually enter a credit relationship with anyone of the institutions, loan 
officers often kept in touch with the clients, mainly through occasional visits. Generally, 
such visits are not programmed. Under normal conditions the visit is simply a short 
friendly stopover, which can be quite informative for the loan officer. According to loan 
officers interviewed in the ambit of this research these visits help monitor the changes in 
the risk profile of the clients. Furthermore, they serve as a reminder to the clients about 
their obligations to the institutions.  As one loan officer put it,  
by just seeing us they may remember that the date for the repayment of their debt is near, 
usually we visit them towards the end of the month when most payments are nearly due. It 
is also during these visits that we help clients with how to improve their business, often in 
response to their request; we normally just ask how their businesses are going and if they 
need any assistance, and when it is within our capacity we help free of charge61. 
 
As is evident from the above interview extract, monitoring of clients is not only a risk 
management mechanisms but a vehicle through which lenders keep in touch with their 
clients to offer them any necessary assistance which lenders can afford.  
 
4.4.3 Practical and rapid reaction to arrears 
In the case of default or the likelihood thereof, loan officers visit the clients a day after the 
due date to establish the causes of the failure to repay. When failure to repay is a result of 
factors beyond the clients’ control, depending on the clients’ reputation and credit 
histories, rescheduling of repayment plans and even refinancing are possible. In the main, 
                                                 
60 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
61 Interview with Miguel, loan officer for institution A 
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however, defaulters are given a period of sixty (60) days to settle the debt.  
 
Failure to do so results in the seizure of property which is retained by the institution for a 
further sixty days (60); during this period they can reclaim their property upon the 
settlement of all debt and be readmitted at a later stage. However, failure to settle the debt 
during the grace period means the property is auctioned out, and the client is black listed.62   
 
If failure to repay results from a simple unwillingness to repay or from irresponsible 
management of the enterprise the defaulters are given a period of thirty (30) days to settle 
the debt.  If they fail to do this, all property pledged as collateral is forfeited and kept in the 
warehouse of the institutions for a period of thirty (30) days63.  During this period the 
clients can get their goods if they can repay their debt, and are given the opportunity to 
rejoin the programme. Failure to settle all outstanding debt in this period means the goods 
are auctioned and the defaulter is denied future access to credit, at a great loss to both the 
lender and the defaulter. According to loan officers interviewed, this practice is less 
frequent on the whole since most borrowers manage to repay within the grace periods.   
 
Unlike institution A, institution B is more strict in reacting to arrears. Loan officers visit 
the clients a day after a repayment date is skipped notifying the client to repay within 30 
days; failure to meet this deadline result in the seizer of collateral pledged and subsequent 
auctioning. The client does not have as long a grace period as the clients of institution A. 
Asked about why institution B is so strict when it comes to missing repayment dates, a 
senior officer in the institution had this to say: 
We have had a bad experience with defaulting during the period when we operated as a not 
                                                 
62 Ibid 
63 This operation is done by officers from the institutions and the police is involved in case of resistance by 
the defaulter 
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for profit institution. We therefore have the responsibility to show to our clients that we are 
no longer the “charity” institution we used to be, by being quick at responding to arrears. 
This cultivates in our clients the culture of repaying debt and this is working64. 
 
By and large, the two institutions seem apt for the great challenge of providing credit and 
other services to a clientele that has been excluded from the formal credit markets. They 
seem serious and set for self-sufficiency judging buy their determination to attain 
sustainable returns on investment for their shareholders, high loan recovery rates, their cost 
recovery pricing, their growing borrower and loan portfolios, and their seriousness with 
ensuring that bad risk clients are prevented from entering credit relationships. There are 
however serious challenges that the institutions face, which a away reduces their capacity 
to attain desirable levels of outreach, impact and returns on investment. Some of the 
challenges are highlighted in this paper. 
 
 
4.5 Key features and trends of the lending technology and the 
relationship between clients and lenders in Beira 
4.5.1 Lending technology 
• A long-term relationship is more valuable for both lenders and clients than a one-
off arm’s length transaction 
• Loans are tailored to individual demand, but more importantly to the capacity and 
willingness to repay 
• Loan officers are the people through which the clients relate to the institutions 
• Loan granting decisions are taken and communicated quickly 
• Clients are monitored frequently through both programmed and surprise visits 
                                                 
64 Interview with Carlos,  senior officer of institution B 
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• Services are personalised  
• Greater emphasis on social mobilisation transparency and communication 
• Non-traditional mechanisms for managing risk and delinquency are used: non-
traditional assets, frequent repayment schedules, short terms to maturity, small 
initial loan sizes, subsequent improvement in terms and conditions 
4.5.2 Characteristics most appreciated  
• On the whole entry requirements such as documentations are considered realistic 
especially for subsequent applications 
• Guaranteed availability of credit to those who qualify  
• Promptness in credit granting or rejection decisions 
• Personalised services 
• Adaptability of terms and conditions to individual clients on the basis of their needs 
and capacity to repay 
• Subsequent improvements of terms and conditions e.g. repayment plans and terms 
to maturity 
• High quality service- clients say they are treated with respect like equal parties in a 
win-win deal 
• Wider variety of products offered  
• Transparency- clients are happy that they enter credit relationships knowing what 
the responsibilities of the two parties are exactly.  
• The possibility for contract renegotiations   
• The location of the branches is convenient for them 
• Assistance given to clients by loan officers on how to improve their business and 
produce records 
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4.5.3 Characteristics least appreciated  
• Rigid initial entry requirements 
• The co-signer, collateral and the twelve (12) months business experience, high 
interest rates 
• Too many personal questions including enquiring about them from others who 
could lie about them due to personal differences65 
• Lack of systemic business support development programmes 
• Limits on the sizes of the loan 
4.5.4 Challenges the clients face 
• Saturated markets with many people doing the same kind of business hence low 
levels of returns on investments 
• Having to resort to informal lenders in order to keep up with their repayment plans 
so that they are not excluded from formal credit markets due to a history of default 
• Poor public services such as water and electricity, which are often expensive when 
available 
• Lack of systematic technical assistance on managing enterprises 
• Poor conditions in the markets where they do their business which keep clients 
away especially during rainy seasons because the area is swampy with rudimentary 
infrastructure.  
• Clients are obliged to ferry their inventory from home and to the markets at the 
beginning and end of each they due to lack of storage facilities in all major 
                                                 
65 This concern was expressed by 15 out of the 20 active clients interviewed. Some of the personal questions 
mentioned include the number of wives and in the case of those who are divorced, the reasons for the divorce 
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markets66 
 
4.5.5 Challenges to the institutions 
• Low levels of returns due to high administrative costs and macroeconomic 
fluctuations (exchange rates and inflation)  
• Most clients can not meet the actual requirements yet they are considerably fair  
• Difficult to recruit competent loan officers locally, it is even more difficult to retain 
them- this is a serious problem considering that loan officers are often subjected to 
expensive training and their short stay with the institutions constitute great losses to 
the institutions 
• Lack of capacity to provide more systemic business support programmes 
• High levels of risk aversion which leads to slow expansion in borrower portfolio 
 
4.5.6 What lenders appreciate from their clients 
• Lenders appreciate that clients understand and accept the rationale for most of the 
requirements, terms and conditions although they find some of them rigid and 
difficult 
• Lenders are generally happy with the repayment behaviour of their clients and their 
commitment to reveal information that the lenders need to make credit decisions 
• Lenders are happy with high levels of referrals from active clients  
• Lenders are happy that active clients purchase credit on a recurring basis 
• Lenders are happy that clients are increasingly using other products such as savings 
                                                 
66 The lack of storage facilities is visible and was observed by the researcher. The markets are mainly 
rudimentary structures characteristic of informal constructions. It the early hours of the morning and of the 
evening the movement of people carrying their belongings to and from the market are common, 
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• Lenders are happy with the fact that clients generally communicate problems early 
enough at stages they can be remedied 
• Client loyalty, clients generally purchase services and products from the same 
institution and fulfil their obligations such as repayment.  
 
In general, the majority of the poor do not manage to meet the requirements. High levels of 
poverty and constraining macroeconomic environment make it difficult for most of the 
poor to manage the minimum social and economic capital necessary to manage debt. Profit 
opportunities are scarce in a macroeconomic environment in which per capita incomes are 
low and infrastructure is almost non existent and weak? Therefore, with reduced 
entrepreneurial opportunities and a weak asset base most among the poor do not qualify for 
commercial micro-credit, which further impedes the development of entrepreneurship 
among the poor. 
 
Furthermore, according to Athmer and Hunguana (2004) the low levels of outreach, in the 
country as a whole, are due to the fact that institutions target very high67 by concentrating 
on low risk clients. This was indeed confirmed by a respondent from one of the 
institutions, who affirmed that, 
…although we do not intend to attain sustainability and ensure sustainable returns on 
investment for our shareholders on a short-term and at the expense of our clients, we have 
to ensure that we are lending to clients who have a demonstrated capacity to run productive 
enterprises and repay loans. This is important for our survival as an institution, we can not 
afford to repeat the mistakes made by development banks like BPD [People’s Development 
Bank] which collapsed because they did not ensure that they lent to clients who were able 
and willing to repay. They failed even with subsidies; what about us who depend on loans 
from other lenders and revenues from out products? This is not to say that we do not want 
to see our borrower portfolios expanding but that we have to be careful. It is my hope that 
                                                 
67 To target high means that their entry requirements are too high to be met by the majority of the poor hence 
the incidence of the moderate poor and above in the credit programmes 
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in the long-term many people will have access. We are doing all we can to achieve this...68 
 
It is evident, from the above response, that with this kind of targeting, which is not 
necessarily bad from a financial sustainability point of view, indeed many needy clients at 
least in the short-term will continue to face exclusion from formal credit markets in Beira. 
If microfinance has to have any meaningful impact lenders should take a bit more risk than 
they do at present, by coming up with substitutes for some entry requirements and risk 
management mechanisms e.g. collateral that often prevent many needy people from 
entering credit relationships. 
 
An important lesson learned from this study is that the microfinance industry alone can 
only achieve symbolic impact on entrepreneurship and poverty reduction, a realisation 
often overlooked by promoters of microfinance hence the over enthusiasm with 
microfinance and less attention on the identification of other more practical poverty 
reduction tools or those than have a complementary relationship with microfinance e.g. 
safety nets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Interview with Mr. Boris the Senior officer of Institution A 
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5. THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED 
BETWEEN THE TWO CASE STUDY INSTITUTIONS AND 
THE CLIENTS 
This chapter examines the nature of the relationship between the two institutions and their 
clients. The research draws on the relationship measures and dimensions69 highlighted in 
the literature review chapter, to examine the nature of the relationships established between 
the institutions and their respective clients. The chapter concludes that the relationship 
between the institutions and the target group is a close relationship of a long-term nature 
charged by levels of repeat borrowing, progressive lending and other aspects discusses in 
the chapter. The information on which this chapter is based was obtained mainly through 
interviews with clients (both active and potential) and with officers from both institutions. 
The information is further discussed in relations to the literature reviewed in the ambit of 
this search project.  
 
5.1 The nature of the relationships between the institutions and 
the clients 
5.1.1 Close/‘personal’ relationships 
The institutions and their clients are engaged in close relationships. The institutions 
literally go to potential clients and engage them individually in order to elicit the 
information necessary for establishing their credit worthiness, understand their needs -so 
that products are developed to match those needs, and attract potential clients and maintain 
                                                 
69 Relationships measures refer to all the aspects that are fundamental for building relationships and/or those 
aspects that characterise the existence of a relationship. 
 - 71 - 
 
them in the relationships.   
As one respondent put it, 
We believe in staying close to our clients and in knowing them personally because they 
have different needs and we need to ensure that we meet most of those needs, and as such 
we invest in cultivating strong and lasting relationships with our clients, some times our 
loan officers end up establishing social ties that have little do to with business but are 
inevitable given the level of interaction and trust that develop among them, these include 
mediating family conflicts and much more70.  
 
 
This practice is common in Bangladesh particularly in the case of the Grameen bank, 
where loan officers end up being counsellors to some of their clients on personal issues at 
the request of the clients. In this regard, Woolcock observes that, 
the Grameen bank loan officers are often called upon to assume the roles of marriage 
councillors, conflict negotiators, training officers and civic leaders. At the same time the 
loan officers gradually acquire information about borrowers’ credit worthiness which can 
be used in enforcing repayment schedules and other programme decisions (in Navajas, 
1999, p.16). 
 
It is, therefore, worth noting that matured credit relationships go beyond simple financial 
transactions to include social and personal relationships.   
5.1.2 Multidimensional relationships 
The relationships between the two institutions and their clients are multidimensional. This 
means that the relationships are not confined to credit alone but are extended over multiple 
products including savings, technical support -although not systemic, money transfers etc. 
In the reviewed literature, this multidimensionality is known as scope.  
 
Scope is one of the most celebrated relationship measures (Berger et al, 2001 and 
                                                 
70 Interview with Carlos, senior officer for institution B 
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Nalukenge, 2003). In terms of scope, referred to in literature as the number of products a 
particular client purchases from the same lender and the intensity thereof (Cole, 1998; 
Ongena and Smith, 2001) it can be said that the relationships between the institutions and 
their clients are strong and multidimensional.  
 
5.1.3 Individual clients borrow from one formal institution 
Most of the clients interviewed said that they purchased all their financial products from 
their particular institutions except for those the institutions do not supply. Respondents 
believe that if they purchase all their products and services from the same institutions the 
transactions are faster and they develop a reputation of patronage from which they hope to 
benefit in the long-run. This is evidence for the strength of the relationship between the 
clients and the lenders. Thirty percent (30%) of the respondents said, however, that they 
still resort to relatives and friends when they need additional money to keep up with their 
repayment obligations with the institutions for fear of being excluded from the credit 
programmes71. Although fear is not a good attribute in a relationship, the preoccupation 
with staying in the programme is a positive indication that clients indeed value their 
relationships with lenders.   
5.1.4 Long-term relationships 
The institutions and the clients, particularly active clients are engaged in long-term 
relationships. The institutions are profit oriented and set to stay at the service of their 
clients in the long-term. Clients on the other hand would like to have continuous access to 
credit and go to great lengths to repay their loans.  
 
                                                 
71 This shows that strong social networks are beneficial for both the poor clients and the lending institutions. 
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This is indicative of the strength of the relationship between the lenders and the clients; 
since the strength of the relationship between lenders and borrowers is mainly measured in 
terms of duration (the time period a given client has stayed with the a particular institution 
(Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2005; Petersen and Rajan, 1994), one 
can conclude that there is strong long-term relationship between the two (2) institutions 
and their clients.  
 
The institutions, just like the clients are particularly interested in long-term relationships 
and deliberately invest time and effort to build and sustain such relationships. In this 
regard, a respondent said that, 
we invest in retaining our clients by  providing them with the best possible quality of 
services because the cost of acquiring new clients is far greater than the cost of maintaining 
a relationship with a current client for long periods of time72.   
 
In the same vein, a client said  
I will always borrow from [the institution] because I have children to feed and send to 
school. My business is the one that gives me the money to manage that, without credit I 
can hardly survive this is why I would like to stay with the institution for as long as 
possible, staying with my institution is important for me because I do not have go through 
the complex process that people undergo when there are taking loans for the first time73. 
 
 
Another respondent state that, 
With my business I can only make enough money to feed my family and survive. I do not 
make a lot of profit to be able to save or buy property, because of this I always find it 
necessary to borrow from somewhere, be it the bank, family or local money lenders, since I 
am happy with my bank I will stay with it may be for ever God willing74. 
 
                                                 
72 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
73 Interview with Joaninha, client from institution B 
74 Interview wit Castigo, client from institution B 
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 The need for credit on a recurring basis is one of the seasons why clients would want to 
develop and protect long-term relationships with the institutions. In response to the 
question why they found it important to repay their loans common responses included: “so 
that when I apply again they will give me75” and “so that the institution does not go 
bankrupt and leave us with not source of credit76”. Whatever these responses may mean, 
one thing is clear, clients seem to care about the survival of the institutions and continuing 
with the relationship. One respondent explained why she made sure she paid her loans 
punctually in the following terms, 
I pay because if I do not pay the bank will ‘die’, I know it sounds ridiculous to make it 
appear as if one person alone can kill the bank, but imagine if many of us do not repay, it 
will certainly die and there is no many without one so my paying is important for the bank. 
You know before banks like [this one], we struggled to get credit; I do not think anyone 
wants to experience those moments again by killing these banks. I always tell my friends 
this I am telling you now77. 
 
An important aspect that stands out in this interview extract is that clients are conscious 
about repayment and they mobilise each other to repay their loans and abide by other 
contractual obligations. 
 
The institutions report high levels of client retention and repeat borrowing, these aspects 
are proxied with strong long-term client-lender relationships (Boot, 2000; Berger and 
Udell, 2005). The institutions report that between sixty-five (65%) and seventy percent 
(70%) of their clients have been with them for four (4) years and have taken more than 
four (4) loans78. 
 
The majority of the clients usually apply for further loans after their first one. Seventy-five 
percent (75%) of the respondents said that they had been with the institutions since the 
                                                 
75 Interview with Caetano, client from institution B 
76 Interview with Maita, client from institution A 
77 Interview with Abilio, client from institution A 
78 Institution A reported  that 75%  of their clients are repeat borrowers and institution B reported  65% 
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year 2002 and had taken more than four (4) loans, further confirming the information given 
by the management of the two (2) institutions. It is therefore evident that the institutions 
and the clients value long-term relationships and invent time and effort to build and sustain 
such relationships. 
5.1.5 Win-win relationships 
The relationships between the clients and the institutions can also be described as win-win 
relationships. In general the relationships are characterised by fairness on the part of the 
institutions and loyalty in terms of repayment on the part of the clients. The clients get the 
credit and other services and other forms of support from the institutions, and in return the 
institutions get returns on their investments through the fees and other charges, paid by the 
clients. The institutions are generally happy with the repayment behaviour of their clients 
and the clients do not feel exploited by the institutions, in fact they are happy to be 
associated with reliable formal lenders. 
 
Clients often contribute to the building and sustaining their relationships with lenders by 
keeping their relationship obligations, particularly repayment (Ongena and Smith, 1998; 
Bharath et al., 2004). Going by the levels of repayment and the prospect of self-sufficiency 
of the institutions, one can say that the relationship between the clients and the institutions 
is a win-win relationship.  
 
In accordance with the relationship lending literature, the lending technology employed by 
the two institutions, the perceptions and the attitude of both the intuitions and the clients 
towards one another point to the existence of good rapport between or among the parties; 
especially in as far as active clients are concerned. The positive repayment performance of 
the clients of both institutions (97% repayment levels are reported by the institutions)  are 
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suggestive of, among others, the satisfaction of the clients with the service they get 
particularly after their first loans. This is further corroborated by the levels of repeat 
borrowing for both institutions which stand at over 65%. Therefore, clients get access to 
credit on the one hand, and the institutions gain the loyalty of their clients and enjoy good 
levels of repeat borrowing and high repayment rates. 
 
5.1.6 Relationship of tolerance  
Consistent with the relationship lending literature (Dahiya, et al., 2003) and as an indicator 
of the strength of their relationship with clients, the institutions are open to renegotiating 
contract terms such as postponing repayments or even refinancing established clients who 
face emergencies or crisis which can be overcome by making more money available to 
them. A respondent from one of the institutions said that,  
we understand that every individual can face challenging situations which they can not 
control. In such cases we do reschedule repayments or refinance clients provided it is 
evident that the problems are genuine and that the clients are able to bounce back. We, 
however, try to limit this practice because of the danger that clients might misuse this 
provision79.  
 
Indeed four (4) of the twenty (20) clients interviewed confirmed that they were given a 
loan even though they had arrears that resulted from misfortunes that were beyond their 
control. These clients are established clients, two (2) have been with the respective 
institution for five (5) years and the other two (2) for four (4) years.  
The answer, therefore, to the question of what kind of relationship is established between 
the two formal microfinance institutions and the poor in Beira-Mozambique, is that it is a 
close long-term relationship in which the clients are generally satisfied with the services 
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they get, and the institutions are happy with the general repayment behaviour of their 
clients. 
 
5.2 How relationships are built and sustained 
The means through which the relationships between the clients and the two institutions are 
built are in accordance with relationship building process outlined in the literature review 
section particularly the subsection relationship building processes and dimensions. These 
include: 
 
5.2.1 Locating office branches near the target group 
The institutions are located within walking distances from both the homes and the business 
premises of the target group (near informal and formal market and populous suburbs). 
Respondents confirmed that their decisions for choosing the particular institutions were 
partly informed by geographic proximity since they do not have to walk long distances to 
the branch office or incur transport costs. One respondent had this to say in relation to the 
location of the institutions,  
I do not need any transport to go to the bank. I can walk to it from here [market]. It is also 
not far from my home. It is so convenient I like it, this is one reason why I choose it80. 
 
Proximity is therefore indeed decisive for relationship building and sustenance, especially 
in this particular market. As one respondent put it,  
it is common sense that if you are close to them [clients] both physically and emotionally it 
is ease for us to interact with them and provide support. It makes our relationship stronger. 
The fact that they see the institutions almost every day also serves to remind them of their 
                                                 
80 Cufa,  client  from institution B 
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obligations with the institution, and it makes it easy for them to visit the office81. 
 
This is consistent with Bharath, et al., (2004), Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994) and Beck and 
da la Torre (2004) who consider the location of branches near the client base as important, 
not only for attracting clients into credit relationships with lenders but also, for maintaining 
them in the relationships.  
 
5.2.2 Personal selling and social mobilisation 
The institutions do very little indirect marketing, but rely instead on word of mouth, often 
one-to-one marketing82. The marketing strategy employed by the institutions constitutes 
the only way the institutions relate to the target group or market niche as a whole. 
 
The level of social mobilisation, particularly the personalised way in which marketing is 
done, puts the institutions closer to most people who are have the potential to enter credit 
relationships.  Respondents confirmed that loan officers are often out in the field 
mobilising people to enter credit relationships with their institutions. One respondent said 
in this regard that,  
I have had several contacts with loan officer from both institutions. They are very nice 
people, they have time and the patience to explain how the credit programme works and 
they even give us advice on how to improve our business. I am not in the credit programme 
myself but each time they are in this market they relate to us in a good way83. 
 
Therefore, the institutions are not only close in relation to their current clients but to the 
target group in general84.  
                                                 
81 Interview with Carlos, senior officer for institution B 
82 Information from senior officers and loan officers of both institutions 
83 Interview with Amelia, potential client  
84 Five non-clients who were interviewed  several months (05-12 October 2006) after the twenty clients have 
said that they have had several contacts with loan officers from the two institutions but have fallen short of  
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Consistent with Wright et al., (2003) personal selling or marketing constitutes an important 
first step in the establishment of client lender relationships. More importantly, it is the 
means through which effective credit relationships are built and maintained. The majority 
of the respondents interviewed (15 of the 20) confirmed that, before being approached by 
the loan officers they did not think they could be eligible for credit with any of the two 
institutions. This is consistent with the ADB (2000) which considers social mobilisation to  
 
be instrumental for helping the target group take advantage of opportunities to engage in 
credit relationships with formal lenders. According to Wright, et al., (2003) personal 
selling: 
provides a unique opportunity to educate clients…since it involves having field staff … out 
in the cities, towns and villages selling the MFI and its services…making presentations to 
each and any gathering of the target market – from school open days to meetings of 
vendors’ associations…employers needing efficient banking services for their lower-paid 
staff (p.15). 
 
Personal selling and social mobilisation are important for giving individuals confidence to 
engage in credit relationships. 
 
This is also consistent with Hashemi et al., (2006) who argue that risk aversion among the 
poor is more a confidence problem than a true reflection of fear of taking risks. This is 
further consistent with Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2005) who consider relationships as not 
only important in the loan grating decision but also on the decision to apply. This is 
corroborated by fourteen (14) of the twenty (20) respondents who said that the fact that 
their loan officers related to them even before they joined the institutions impressed them 
and made them realise that their chances of getting credit were high.  
                                                                                                                                                    
joining the institutions for reasons ranging from failure to meet the entry requirements to simply choosing not 
the be in debt. The generally seemed to be happy with interest free loans from family and friends.  
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Another salient variant of relationship measure marketing, which is consistent with Ongena 
and Smith (1998), is the participation of active clients in the marketing of their respective 
institutions.  Loan officers interviewed in the ambit of this research project indicated that 
established clients play a critical role in marketing the institutions to friends and relatives. 
A respondent affirmed in this regard that: 
Our clients are important actors in the marketing of our institutions and products. Most of 
our clients get to know and enter our credit programmes through their acquaintances85. 
 
In fact, about forty percent (60%) of the clients interviewed said they came to know the 
institutions through their friends and/or relatives. The remaining 40% said that they knew 
the institutions through loan officers and/or through the promotional campaigns carried out 
by the institutions. 
 
5.2.3 Communication and Transparency 
As can be inferred from the description and analysis of the lending technology employed 
by the institutions in the previous chapter, lenders deal with their clients in a transparent86 
way. Emphasis on communication is an important incentive for clients to enter and stay in 
credit relationships (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996). 
 
Asked about the requirements for entering credit relationships with their respective 
institutions, respondents seemed well informed about all it takes to engage in a credit 
relationship with the two institutions, including the bureaucratic exigencies, the borrowing 
process, loan terms and conditions, and what they should expect from the institutions and 
                                                 
85 Interview with Rosa, loan officer for institution B 
86 Transparent or transparent means that the rules of the game are clear to all participant and they are actually  
observed especially by the lender 
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what the institutions expects from them. They know the exact amounts they have to pay for 
the loans they take, when and how to repay. One respondent said,  
I know the whole process; I knew it before I started borrowing because the loan officer 
explained it in a way poor people like me who did not go to school can understand. I went 
through it [the application process] many times but the loan officers never takes it for 
granted, they keep explaining things as if it was your first time; it is good. I do not 
understand the percentages and the likes but I know the amounts I have to pay, part by part, 
principal, interest, commission…87. 
 
Respondents in general seemed impressed by the fact that loan officers give them as much 
information as they want, most times in a simple and easy to understand form. Loan 
officers are also happy with the levels of information disclosure by the majority of their 
clients. One of them commented in the following words, 
There is generally good communication between us and our clients, which make it easy for 
us to adapt out products and lending technology to match their needs. Generally, when 
clients are having problems we hear it directly from the concerned clients themselves; we 
usually encourage this practice88. 
 
Transparency and communication are therefore important factors for building and 
sustaining relationships for it fosters mutual trust between the parties. In fact, Brusky and 
Fortuna (2002) argue that transparency is essential for the establishment of strong 
relationship between the institutions and their clients.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 Interview with Muti, a client from institution A 
88 Interview with Garicai, loan officer from institution A 
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5.2.4 Progressive lending 
The two institutions often start by giving their clients smaller loans than they actually 
qualify for, with the promise of larger loans with the intuition of testing their willingness 
and ability to repay debt. When clients perform well, loans are gradually, increased. This 
process leads to greater client retention and the consequent establishment of long-term 
credit relationship between the institutions and the clients.  A respondent confirmed this by 
saying that: 
 
One way we ensure use to keep our clients in a long-term relationship with us is by giving 
them loan sizes that are just enough for their current projects and promise larger 
subsequent loans provided they show improvement in their debt management practices89.  
 
In the same vein another respondent said, 
 
…by giving our clients small initial loans and increase them with subsequent applications 
we learn about the capacity of the borrower to manage debt before we commit large 
amounts to the particular client on the one hand, and on the other we encourage the 
borrower to borrow repeatedly90. 
 
Although the sample both of the lending institutions and the interviewees is small, two (2) 
and thirty one (31) respectively, the analysis suggests that, in Beira progressive lending is, 
in addition to being a risk management mechanism as is traditionally known, also an 
instrument used by lenders to build and maintain close long-term credit relationships with 
clients.  
 
                                                 
89 Interview with Carlos, senior officer for institution B 
90 Interview with Boris senior officer for institution A 
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5.2.5 Frequent repayment schedules 
Consistent with relationship lending literature particularly de Aghion and Morduch (2000) 
who argue that “regular repayment schedules help offer bank staff with the protocol by 
which to get to know clients over time, in this way personalised relationships are 
established just as with local money lenders” (p.13), the two institutions also employ 
another risk management strategy, namely frequent repayment schedules as a relationship 
building and sustenance instrument.   Clients have to repay their loans on a monthly basis. 
They have to visit the branch office of the respective institution to make the payment; 
during this period the institutions have an opportunity to have contact with the client. Over 
time the client and the institution get used to and to know each other well, hence the 
solidification of the relationship. As a respondent put it:  
By asking our clients to make frequent repayments we have repeated opportunities 
to track our clients, learn more about them and retain them in our credit 
programmes91. 
 
Frequent repayment schedules are therefore a means through which repetitive contact 
between the institutions and the clients are made. This ensures that they develop are 
relationship of closeness resulting from continued interaction.  
 
5.2.6 Quality of service 
The management of the two institutions affirmed that one of the central pillars of their 
lending technology is the quality of service they offer to their clients. One respondent said,  
In all our practices we ensure that our clients have the best possible treatment and quality 
of services. We value professionalism and promptness, in providing clients not only with 
what they want but how they want, provided it is within their capacity and willingness to 
                                                 
91 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
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repay in the case of credit92.  
 
The respondent went on to say, 
to achieve this we stay as close as possible to our clients and develop a personal 
relationship with each of them because we are aware that they have different needs, which 
can only be met if we are personally related to them and understand them better93.  
 
One of the most important issues outlined by the clients in this regard was the fact that they 
were treated with dignity and that loan officers were always ready to help them with 
matters pertaining, not only, to their debt but also their businesses. A respondent confirmed 
this when saying, 
of all the places I have gone for services in this city, the only place I have seen poor people 
like me being treated like a real client and person, is at my bank. People there are very 
friendly and professional. I have had to pay bribes in many places because this is the most 
common way you make some people remember you are a person like them. But with this 
bank and [that other one] I have never had people complain about bribes. If people 
everywhere worked like them, this country would go far…I am not saying we never get no 
as a response at the bank, we get that many times but it is not done in a way as if to say 
never come back here, I hope you understand what I am saying…94. 
 
A closer look at the lending technology employed by the two institutions, described in the 
previous chapter, shows that the services, from marketing to disbursement and throughout 
the lifecycle of the loan, are quick and highly personalised; with loan officers being 
meticulous in the whole application process. Furthermore, clients do not necessarily need 
to go to the institutions all the time for information or any other thing that can be offered at 
their homes or business premises because the institutions literally go to them.  As one loan 
officer put it,  
                                                 
92 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
93 ibid 
94 Interview with Chicamisse, client from institution A 
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we spend very little time in our branch offices, we are field workers out to win more and 
more clients and keep in touch with current clients95. 
 
Indeed, service delivery is highly personalised with loan officers literally establishing 
personal contact with individual before, during and after the actual credit relationships are 
built. In delivering credit and other products, the specific needs of individual clients are 
taken into account and efforts are made to ensure that the products are delivered the way 
the clients want, especially after the first transaction. This does not necessarily mean that 
clients get exactly what they want, but they get what they can manage. Loans are often 
contingent on the clients’ income flows and the capacity to manage debt.   
 
The impact of quality personalised services on relationship building and sustenance is 
emphasised by Gonzalez Vega et al., (1996) in their work on Banco Sol in the following 
terms: “The highly personalised service offered to the clients represents an additional 
powerful incentive for repayment. A long-term connection is developed between the loan 
officer and the borrower and powerful information incentives to fulfil contract 
commitments emerge from this bond (p.16).  
 
5.2.7 Encouraging clients to be savers 
Another means through which the two institutions build and sustain close long-term 
relationships with their clients is by encouraging them to open saving accounts. This is also 
the practice at the Grameen Bank, except for the fact that in the case of these two 
institutions saving is voluntary not compulsory.  As a senior officer from one of the 
institutions stated that: 
                                                 
95 Interview with Luisa, loan officer for institution B 
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To build and sustain our relationships with the clients we encourage them to be open 
savings accounts with us, because we understand that relationships are stronger when you 
are related in more ways than one96. 
 
This is an important mechanism for building long-term relationships since clients may 
develop more affinity with the institution by knowing they have some stake in the 
institution.  
 
5.2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes that the two formal microfinance institutions and the target group, 
particularly active borrowers with good repayment performances, are engaged in close 
long-term relationships. The relationships are mainly characterised by personalised service 
delivery from marketing to loan recovery, and considerable levels of repeat borrowing as 
was shown earlier in the paper. The institutions as well as the clients continuously strive to 
build and maintain the relationships in various ways, among them progressive lending, 
better terms and conditions for subsequent loans, emphasis on communication in the case 
of the institutions and repeat borrowing and good repayment performance in the case of the 
clients. 
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6. BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE TARGET GROUP 
 
This chapter examines the benefits that both the institutions and the target group gain from 
the established relationship between them. In the previous chapter the study concludes that 
the relationships between the two parties are close and have a long-term horizon.  
 
In general, theoretical and empirical research on financial intermediation, finance and 
banking, reveal  that the stronger the relationships becomes, the more and the easier the 
information necessary for making lending or borrowing decisions is shared between the 
parties (Bharath, 2004; Degryse and Ongena, 2000).  Berger and Udell, 2002 contend that 
the stronger the relationship, the less costly it becomes to gather information about the 
borrower and that product development becomes more responsive to the needs of the 
clients97. 
 
It is further argued that the stronger the relationships between clients and lenders, the 
higher the client discipline and repayment behaviour (Berger at al., 2001; Churchill, 1999, 
2000); the greater the sustainability of the institutions (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Mishkin, 
2004); and the more accessible and available credit becomes to the target group (Ferri, 
2001; Mishkin, 2004; Hashemi at al., 2006). All of these benefits enhance the probability 
of greater entrepreneurial development among the target group and greater financial 
sustainability for the lenders (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1994). 
 
This study finds the relationship established between the two institutions and the clients in 
Beira, to have more or less the same benefits to both clients and lenders as those outlined 
                                                 
97 See also Boot, 2000 and Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2004 
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in the literature. The benefits seem to be more relevant for active clients, although the 
target group in general benefits from contact with formal lenders through the marketing 
strategy they employ, which blesses them with some sort of borrowing education or 
awareness and more importantly the prospect of joining the institutions in the future. 
 
6.1 Benefits to the lenders 
6.1.1 Greater information acquisition for effective screening and 
product development  
Information sharing in the case of Beira is one of the benefits of the relationship 
established between lenders and the clients, both potential and active. The strength of the 
relationship between clients and lenders, and their daily interactions, give lenders an idea 
of the risk profile of clients which facilitates the screening of ‘bad risk’ clients from the 
good risk ones and gives them a clear idea of what clients want and need. The institutions 
are able to identify more or less what clients like and dislike and why, and to make timely 
and suitable responses98.  
 
A respondent from one of the institutions said in this regard that,  
the relationship we develop with our clients both potential and active helps us get most of 
the information without which lending would not occur or would occur with great 
difficulty because most people do not have records of their businesses transactions nor 
have the capacity to produce them. We base our lending on estimates of their incomes and 
reputations obtained from our interactions with them. Note also that we manage to match 
our practices and products to their needs because our relationship helps us understand 
them99. 
 
                                                 
98 Information from Boris, senior officer for institution A 
99 Interview with Carlos, senior officer institution B 
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Close long-term relationships are there for instrumental for information gathering and 
product development that meets the needs of the clients. Meeting clients’ needs is not only 
important for lenders to establish a reputation for service but also to help clients manage 
their loans effectively, hence ensuring repayment and their own development as reputable 
clients, and in so doing enhancing their financial and business opportunities in local 
markets as well as the sustainability of the lenders.. 
 
6.1.2 Reduction in costs of provision 
Lenders claim that their relationship with clients helps them minimise lending related 
costs. They say that they need less time and effort to establish the creditworthiness of an 
applicant with whom they are closely related, giving the loan officer time to deal with 
others and as such enhance their own productivity. Furthermore, their relationship helps 
them evaluate the applicants more accurately and as such minimise the probability of 
losses from default. As a respondent put it, 
knowing our clients personally helps us understand the environment in which they work 
and their capacity to manage debt which helps us reduce the chances that a bad risk client 
is approved or vice versa, this is generally much easier with repeat borrowers100. 
 
It is therefore clear that lenders do indeed benefits from establishing close long-term 
relationships with clients by having their lending costs reduced. This is important for the 
sustainability of the institutions given that micro lending is a very costly business which 
can not be sustained by fees and interest rates alone but by a combination of factors 
including the reduction of lending or administrative costs. 
 
                                                 
100 Interview with Boris, senior officer institution A 
 - 90 - 
 
6.1.3 Easier monitoring of clients 
Institutions find it ease to monitor clients because the relationship helps them understand 
clients well and have access to their households and business premises when necessary,  
because we know our clients well and we are often welcome to pay them visits often 
stopovers when we are in the field it is very ease for us to spot any signs of trouble that 
may lead to default early enough to deal with it accordingly, not necessarily harshly101. 
 
Therefore developing close long-term relationships with clients makes it ease for lenders to 
monitor clients to check for any changes in their risk profiles and/or in fact reduce the need 
for such monitoring since the strength of the relationship can make clients more 
responsible and committed to their contractual obligations with little or no monitoring at 
all. 
 
6.1.4 Better client retention 
Client retention is another benefit highlighted by lenders. Lenders have said that the 
strength of their relationship with clients helps them retain clients. In this regard, a 
respondent stated,  
An important benefit that emanates from our relationship with clients is that most of them 
stick with the programme. This brings us further benefits because the clients cost us less in 
terms of monitoring and usually get larger loans which significantly reduce our costs 
because smaller loans are very expensive; since loan officers tend to spend less time on the 
application  and assessment processes of repeat borrowers, retaining more clients improves 
our operational efficiency102. 
 
This is consistent with Ongena and Smith (2001) and Wright (1997) who argue that 
retaining clients is important for sustainability and efficiency. Indeed most of the clients 
interviewed affirmed that they would stay with their respective institutions because they 
                                                 
101 Interview with Miguel, loan officer for institution A 
102 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
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are generally happy with their services. 
 
6.1.5 Enhanced client discipline and high repayment rates 
One of the benefits of the relationship established between the institutions and the lenders 
most cited by respondents within the institutions and consistent with Churchill (2000) is 
enhanced client discipline, particularly when it comes to repayment. Lenders believe that 
their ninety seven percent (97%) repayment rate is a direct result of the rapport between 
them and the clients.  
As one respondent put it,  
above all the mechanisms we put in place to encourage repayment, treating our clients as if 
they were shareholders of the institutions helps us attain high levels of repayment. Our 
clients are loyal because we communicate to them the values of being loyal not only 
verbally but also by keeping our promises and assisting them whenever we can103. 
 
In response to the question why they paid their loans, most respondent gave reasons 
including: to ensure that the institution did not go bankrupt and leave them and others 
without a formal source of credit, fear of exclusion from future access to loans from any 
formal institution, the need to preserve the relationship with a reliable lender and fear of 
losing the goods they pledged as collateral. In great part these responses actually show that 
indeed the institutions have given their clients some degree of education which makes 
them understand the need to repay their loans. It is, therefore, evident and consistent with 
Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994) that when the lender is closely related to the client and the 
deal between them is well understood, strong client lender relationships are fundamental in 
ensuring repayment.  
 
                                                 
103 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
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6.1.6 Borrower and loan portfolio expansion 
Borrower and loan portfolio expansion results from the relationship between the clients 
and lenders. Sources from within the institutions said that because of the strength of their 
relationships with clients they not only retain clients- who are instrumental for expanding 
their loan portfolio because they typically qualify for larger loans- but also serve as 
incentives to draw other clients into the institutions through referrals, supported by the 
lived experience of active clients.  One respondent had this to say in this regard,  
the ties that exist between us and our clients benefit us in that the clients who are mainly 
happy with us will invite others to the programmes, in most cases clients with a good 
reputation refer clients with an equally good reputation, in so doing helping us expand our 
client base and take advantage of economies of scale to cover our costs and make profits104. 
 
This is a critical benefit since it helps lenders benefit from economies of scale, considering 
that the more clients are served the more efficient the lending can be said to be and the 
greater the likelihood of making profits. This is, however, not automatic; it depends on the 
behaviour and risk profile of the clients in the borrower portfolio, if borrowers are not 
disciplined and the lender fails to provide enough incentives for repayment enlarging 
borrower portfolio can be disastrous and lenders and incur severe loses. This probably 
explains why lenders try to be too selective when it comes to admitting clients into credit 
programmes. 
 
6.1.7 Sustainability 
One of the two institutions, as mentioned earlier, can be considered sustainable in terms of 
it being able to cover all its operational costs and even declare profits, however low they 
may seem, for six (6) consecutive years. The other has only had such good fortune in one 
                                                 
104 Interview with Carlos, senior officer for institution B 
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of the six (6) years, but has expanded aggressively, offering about four (4) times as many 
products as the other institution offers. One explanation is that most of its revenues are 
ploughed back into expansion105. One thing is clear from the findings: the clients are not 
responsible for the average performance of the institutions because they generally have a 
good repayment performance106.  
 
The age of the institutions may be a factor in explaining the low levels of sustainability for 
one institution and no profits for the other. Six (6) years might not be sufficient a time for 
micro lenders to be making big profit margins unless clients are paying dearly for this.  
This was highlighted by respondents from within the institutions. One respondent said,  
our mission is indeed to provide financial services for the low-income segments of the 
population and ensure sustainable returns on investment for our shareholders, not in the 
short-term but in the long-term. We intend to achieve this without passing all the cost 
burdens to our clients, lest we set them to fail and since we depend on their success for our 
business, setting them to fail would be equivalent to setting ourselves to fail. In fact I am 
happy to tell you that we are on the right track and will soon be reaping the fruits of our 
investments107. 
 
This explanation is consistent with Wright (1997) who argues that institutions normally 
“…break even on a customer only after the fourth or fifth loan” (p.2). Considering that the 
institutions have been in operation for just over six (6) years and going by Wright’s 
assertion, the institutions seem to be on the right track. 
Other official explanations include the macroeconomic instability particularly the 
fluctuations of the Mozambican Metical (MZM) in relation to the dollar in the past years.   
The relationship between the institutions and the clients is nonetheless showing 
encouraging signs that ceteris paribus the repayment behaviour and other advantages, 
                                                 
105 Information from a respondents from within the institutions 
106 Both institutions exhibit repayment rates of up to 97% 
107 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
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including reduced provision and monitoring costs, may eventually lead to greater financial 
sustainability and returns on investment for the lenders. 
 
In sum, the two lenders in the city of Beira do benefit from their relationship with clients in 
the same way the relationship literature documents. Through the relationship, the lenders 
are able to more easily elicit the information they need for selecting, monitoring and 
matching products and services to the needs of the clientele. In so doing the institutions 
develop a reputation for service and foster client loyalty to the institutions and, more 
importantly, their commitment to repay. All of these benefits are indispensable for 
institutions that depend on revenues from their clients in order to attain self-sufficiency and 
have sustainable returns on their investments. 
 
6.2 Benefit to clients  
Relationship lending literature shows that clients stand to benefit from a close long-term 
relationship with lenders.  Among the benefits accruing to clients are:  
 
6.2.1 Opportunity to engage in credit relationships with formal lenders  
The pre-transaction interaction between the lenders and the target group takes place mainly 
through marketing. The  marketing strategy used by the two lenders that hinges on 
personal selling is beneficial to the clients in the sense that it provides them with the 
opportunity of having a bit of financial education in terms of borrowing from formal and 
more reliable lenders.  This strategy results in actual credit relationships that clients would 
have never thought of entering with formal lenders. This fact was confirmed by fifteen (15) 
of the twenty (20) active clients interviewed.  It is worth recognising though that this is a 
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benefit particularly if the client benefits from the actual credit relationship, which in some 
instances is not the case. 
 
6.2.3 Simple, quick and flexible application processes 
A prior relationship between the lenders and clients often results in simple, quick and 
flexible subsequent applications. Clients who have taken a loan before or hold an account 
with the particular institutions benefit from simple application processes and very short 
waiting time. This is consistent with Dahiya et al., (2003) who have argued that close long-
term relationships between lenders and clients make subsequent credit decisions more 
flexible and quicker than the preceding ones. In this regard one respondent put it,  
the first time I took a loan the process was not very difficult but the subsequent times were 
much simpler. I usually get loans in less than one hour when I finish paying the one I have. 
The process is very simple, you just have to get through the first one and show the 
institution you are a serious client by repaying punctually108. 
 
This advantage was also outlined by a respondent within one of the institutions, who said 
that, 
While in general we ensure that our services are quick and flexible to all our clients, the 
process is much quicker and more flexible for our repeat clients of whom we have an 
accumulated stock of information sufficient enough to assess the clients very quickly109. 
 
Therefore flexibility in the loan granting process is one of the main advantages clients get 
from winning the trust of their lenders. This is an important advantage considering that the 
poor who often have immediate needs often prefer quicker and flexible access to credit in 
order to benefit from emerging opportunities. 
 
                                                 
108 Interview with Marcos, client from institution B 
109 Interview with Garicai, loan officer for institution A 
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6.2.4 Reduced cost of loans 
The price of the loan is only indirectly related to the strength of the relationship. Interest 
rates are fixed at certain loan ranges. Established clients who characteristically get larger 
loans pay between 0.25% and 0.5% less than first time borrowers who get smaller loan 
sizes.  In short, the price of loans is dependent on the size of the loan. So, if a client takes 
loans within the same interest rate range, the rates remain unchanged independent of the 
intimacy and duration of the client’s relationship with the institution.  This, pretty much, 
reflects the general theoretical and empirical findings on the effect of relationships on 
interest rates, with various researchers coming up with different results. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) for example, found no relationship between strength and longevity of the 
relationship between clients and lenders and interest rates in the United States.  Boot and 
Thakor (1994) on the other hand argue that borrowers pay less as the relationship matures.  
 
In the case of Beira, there is an indirect relationship in that often repeat borrowers go for 
larger loans and as such end up paying between 0.25% and 0.5% less than first time 
borrowers. However, clients benefit from reduced application costs and transport costs as a 
result of less bureaucracy and the proximity of branch offices to their homes and business 
premises. 
 
6.2.5 Collateral 
Collateral is also unrelated to the relationship between the client and the lender i.e., 
regardless of the strength and duration of the relationship between the client and the lender 
collateral of a value of 120% of the loan is pledged as security for the loans. In all the cases 
clients have to pledge collateral. As a respondent put it, 
 - 97 - 
 
We require that our clients pledge collateral for all their loans regardless of the duration of 
the credit relationship or the number of previous loans taken by the client110.  
 
This is contrary to Boot and Thakor (1994) who contend that borrowers pledge less 
collateral with the duration and maturation of the relationship, but consistent with Sharp 
(1990) who contends that collateral is always pledged in any credit transaction involving a 
non-salaried borrower. 
 
6.2.6 Increased loan sizes 
Loan sizes do increase with the duration of the relationship provided the clients’ incomes 
also increase, because the decision on the amount to be given is still dependent on the 
overall income of the applicant established through the credit analysis that is undertaken 
every time an applicant applies for a new loan. As a loan officer stated, 
we mainly give loans on the basis of the prospective returns on the investment of the client 
and the general income of the client. Normally, clients improve their income with the first 
few loans and get larger loans in subsequent applications, not much as a result of the 
relationship itself but principally as a result of the potential ability to repay111. 
 
Therefore the relationship between strong client lender relationships is indirect. The 
relationship only comes at play when the client demonstrates the potential to manage debt. 
However the capacity to manage debt can be greatly enhanced by the duration and the 
strength of the established relationship. In this regard, relationships do influence the size of 
the loan. 
 
                                                 
110 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
111 Interview with Miguel, loan officer for institution A 
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6.2.7 Flexible repayment schedules and terms to maturity 
 Clients with established relationships have the privileged of having more flexible 
repayment plans.  They can choose the length and the frequency with which they wish to 
repay their loans. Clients often prefer longer terms to maturity and small instalments. 
Furthermore, repayment plans can be changed ex-post and adjustments are made 
accordingly. In this regard a respondent affirmed that, 
We are very flexible with our repeat clients when it comes to repayment schedules and 
terms to maturity. We recognise that borrowers often prefer longer terms to maturity and 
small instalment amounts, we give up to twenty-four (24) months for clients to liquidate 
their debt, and we also allow them to adjust their terms to maturity if they want, these 
choices serve as incentives for our established clients to stay with us112. 
 
These benefits are important particularly because they mean that clients’ particular needs 
are taken into account. Furthermore, the repayment plans are developed with the 
participation of the clients, their commitment to abiding by the plans is enhanced.  
 
6.2.8 Rescheduling and refinancing in times of crisis 
Rescheduling and refinancing in times of crisis is perhaps the most important privilege 
after prompt access to subsequent loans. Clients with a reputation for punctual repayment 
and well performing enterprises can have their repayment plans adjusted and even be 
refinanced when they are having a difficult time. One of the clients told of the 
circumstance that led to her refinancing while having an outstanding loan in the following 
words,  
it was back in 2003 when I was involved in an accident and stayed in hospital with a 
broken neck  and both legs for four (4) months and my business collapsed, there was no 
one to take care of it, the way I did. My husband tried but since he was always coming to 
                                                 
112 ibid 
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hospital to see me and was not familiar with the business he could not keep it going; our 
helpers mismanaged the whole thing, I remember a loan officer came to visit me at the 
hospital and telling me not to worry because when I got better they would discuss the issue 
and that they would consider giving me a loan to restart because I was a good client, they 
even allowed me to use the money I had in the account with them to pay my medical bills. 
I did not believe it at first but it actually happened, and I am back again. I tell my friends to 
make sure they have a good rapport with lenders because they can help you when you most 
need113. 
 
It is clear from this testimonial that the reputation and the relationships clients establish 
with lenders in this particular case study do benefit greatly particularly in times of crisis. 
Close long-term relationships are therefore of great value to reputable clients particularly 
in times of distress. 
 
6.2.9 Prestige of being associated with a formal lender 
Clients also enjoy the prestige of being associated with a formal lender in an environment 
in which access to formal institutions is still a privilege. In this regard, one respondent had 
this to say, 
I value my relationship with the bank because I know that as long as I pay my debts they 
will always help me and others like me who need credit but can not get it from the big 
banks. I also like the prestige I get from being associated with the bank. I no longer have to 
knock on peoples doors when I want money, this can be humiliating and you do not know 
what they think when you are always asking for money from people114.  
 
The fact that clients such as Tichaona consider it prestigious to be associated with his 
institution enhances the need for them to protect the relationship hence its strength and 
duration.  
 
                                                 
113 Interview with Laise, client from institution A 
114 Interview with Tichaona, client from institution A 
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6.2.10 Technical and other forms of support 
Technical and other forms of support are among the benefits reaped by clients from their 
relationship with formal lenders. Loan officers go to great length in their relationship with 
clients to help them in issues related with managing their enterprises such as keeping 
records, improving sales, marketing and client service. This kind of support is, however, 
not as systemic as clients would like. It is given informally when loan officers pay the 
clients monitoring visits or simple stopovers, but as one respondent put it,  
…it is better than nothing; at least it shows they care115. 
 
This shows that clients values auxiliary services. Unfortunately in the particular case of 
Beira institutions are still unable to offer systemic auxiliary services to their clients.  There 
is therefore need for lenders worldwide to consider auxiliary services as important as credit 
and savings in dealing with the target group. 
 
6.3 Access to credit  
The study concludes that the moderate poor enjoy convenient and greater access to credit 
as a result of their relationship with the lenders. The relationship makes it easy for lenders 
to screen and monitor them and as such make quick and often favourable credit decisions 
especially if a prior transaction exists between the two. However, despite the efforts made 
by the institutions to expand outreach, access to credit is still a problem for the majority of 
the poor.  
 
A look at the lending technology employed by the institutions including the location of the 
offices, the marketing strategy, the entry requirements, the minimum loan size and the 
                                                 
115 Interview with, Memba client from institution B 
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entry process itself can make one conclude with little hesitation that access is easy and 
levels of outreach are high in Beira. A look at outreach indicators and the size of credit 
constrained population prompts a change of mind altogether.  
 
The combined borrower portfolios for the two intuitions in the city of Beira hardly exceeds 
five thousand clients  (5000) with other few institutions only serving less than two 
thousand in a market with over thirty thousand (30 000)116 people who could benefit from 
access and many more who are credit constrained. Most people stay out of the programmes 
due to the conditions required to enter credit relationships with formal institutions striving 
for self-sufficiency in a volatile economic environment characterised by high levels of 
poverty, low per capita incomes, limited and saturated markets and poor infrastructure 
(Dalglish and Bradley, 2006).   
 
Consistent with Athmer and Hunguana (2004), the moderately poor who have reasonable 
asset base and diversified sources of income are the most served by formal microfinance 
institutions in the city. This group of clients can afford the minimum requirements for 
entering credit relationships and stay in them. This is evidenced by the high levels of client 
retentions reported by the institutions, which means few new clients are recruited into the 
programmes.  For this group, the relationship they have with the institutions results indeed 
in greater access; but for those who cannot break through the barrier imposed by their 
poverty, unfavourable macroeconomic conditions and the requirements enter credit 
programme, stay at the mercy117 of informal lenders or remain totally engulfed in 
exclusion. 
                                                 
116 These figures are estimates given by respondents from within the institutions. The figure of 30000 
potential clients is an average figure, during the interviews two different figures were obtained from the two 
institutions one was 40000 and the other 25000.  
117 Resort to informal lenders 
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The study has concluded that the reason why people stay out of credit programmes is that 
they are too poor to meet the entry requirement for the programmes. This is a paradox 
because micro-credit programmes are said to be instrumental for helping the poor out of 
poverty (Littlefield et al., 2003). In other words it is poverty that makes it appear as though 
there is no culture of borrowing from formal lenders in Beira.   
 
Poverty makes it difficult for people to meet the requirements for entering credit 
relationships. In fact, the high percentage (40%) of potential applicants who desist after the 
first credit talk attests to the willingness of people to engage in credit relationships with 
lenders but more importantly, it attests to the fact that the requirements set by the 
institutions are beyond the means of many who are willing to enter credit relationships 
with the institutions. As a result most of them borrow from family, friends, and suppliers118 
and in the last resort from informal lenders who charge interest for the loans. 
 
A respondent confirmed that they borrower from fiends and suppliers because they are 
used to it, but more importantly because,  
borrowing money from a formal institution is difficult, they want me to have things like 
television, refrigerator or something big. Most of us do not have even electricity, how can 
we be accepted. I know the other banks want bigger things than these institutions and some 
of our colleagues who have the things the institutions want borrow from these institutions 
many of us can not. May be one day we will119.   
 
The client here raises an important issue related to collateral. Although the collateral asked 
is indeed non-traditional as described in relationship lending literature, the level of poverty 
of many people make it difficult for them to own even the most basic goods. This raises an 
important issue that theorists and practitioners must consider when theorising about 
                                                 
118 Credit from suppliers is always in kind; that is the people get products and pay for them at a later stage 
119 Interview with Marta, a potential client 
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microfinance i.e. poverty needs to be addressed, by other means, in order to lift the poor to 
levels that they can engage with formal commercial lenders who should not be expected to 
issue free loans, or extend loans with no security or any expected returns on the 
investments they make to extend such credit.   
 
Furthermore, it is utopian to assume that everyone has the capacity to manage debt or run 
profitable micro-enterprises to qualify for credit either formal or informal. Put in Morduch 
and Haley (2001)’s words “Microfinance is not for everyone…entrepreneurial skills and 
ability are necessary to run a successful micro enterprise and not all potential customers 
are equally able to take on debt” (p.2) 
 
For the moderately poor, those who can afford three (3) meals a day, send their children to 
school, have one or two employed family members and run relatively profitable 
enterprises, access to credit is indeed very simple, particularly when they have an 
established relationship with the institutions.  Consistent, with Chakravarty and Yilmazer 
(2005), once the clients are in a relationship with the lender in which they have presumably 
established themselves as reputable and reliable clients, they are most likely to apply for 
loans and have their applications approved much quicker and at improved terms and 
conditions than first time borrowers without an established relationship with the lender.  
 
This is further consistent with Mishkin (2004) who argues that close long-term 
relationships between clients and lenders “help lenders to understand their credit needs and 
creditworthiness. It also lowers the cost of collecting information from exiting borrowers, 
and makes it possible for people to access loans relatively easily and possibly at lower 
interest rates” (2004, p.225). 
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6.4 Entrepreneurship 
The two lenders surveyed in the ambit of this study believe that they are doing the best 
they can to ensure that their clients succeed in whatever they do to generate more income 
for themselves.  For them, credit invested in an income-generating enterprise as working 
capital or for productive assets leads to the growth of an exiting enterprise and/or the 
establishment of a new one; profits from the enterprise provide income, and a general 
strengthening of income sources,  
When we reach a decision to actually extend credit to a particular client it is because we 
would have seen in the client the potential for growing their enterprises, which is why we 
undertake a thorough credit analysis each time a client applies for a loan. In the analysis we 
attempt to ascertain that the money we give is enough to help the client seize available 
opportunities to grow their enterprises. Our loan officers also try to help our clients with 
ways they can improve their enterprises, in most cases thanks to the loans and the inputs 
from our loan officers and the efforts of the clients themselves, they manage to actually 
grow their enterprises and double or triple their earnings120. 
 
Additionally, institutions supplying the finance to these entrepreneurs are equally 
dependent on them for business and expansion of outreach as such it is in their interest that 
the enterprises prosper. To achieve this they,  
…ensure that clients have a quick, convenient and continuous access to credit and that the 
use to which these loans are put are monitored without necessarily preventing them from 
taking up profitable opportunities when they arise121.   
 
The respondents further said that one way they contribute to the promotion of 
entrepreneurship is, 
by ensuring that our clients get the right sizes of loans,  pay interest rates, pledge 
                                                 
120 Interview with Boris, senior officer for institution A 
121 Interview with Carlos, senior officer for institution B 
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collateral…serve as incentives for them to put the money into productive use, hence 
helping them be more entrepreneurial122.  
 
Furthermore, besides guiding clients through the borrowing process, loan officers respond 
to requests for business advice, technical assistance and personal encouragement. This 
underscores the institutions’ seriousness with seeing their clients develop their 
entrepreneurial abilities and grow their enterprises, for it is on them that the businesses of 
the institutions’ depend. 
 
Although in some cases clients fail to grow, in others borrowers do at least manage to 
maintain their enterprises thanks to the loans they get from the institutions. As one 
respondent put it,  
Since I started taking loans with the institutions I have never run out of inventory and 
money as I used to do before123. 
 
Asked whether having sold all the stock [running out of inventory] did not automatically 
mean having money, the respondent replied that,  
not necessarily because the money we get from the business is only enough for feeding our 
families, and pay our debts. It is difficult to do business to get rich here; there are many of 
us selling things and very few people to buy124.  
 
Two lessons can be learned from this respondent: first, most of micro-enterprises run by 
the target group are survivalist and as such hardly grow beyond subsistence. Second, 
access to credit keeps them going.  
 
Not everyone, however, is in the same situation as the respondent. Another respondent 
                                                 
122 ibid 
123 Interview with Lorenco, client from institution A 
124 ibid 
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proudly boasted of her success as a result of her relationship with one of the institutions. 
She said, 
I used the money my brother lent me to start a hair salon business, it was a very good 
business I had money to buy most of the things I needed, one day a loan officer came to my 
salon to tell me about credit and how it could help me buy more equipment for the salon 
and employ more people so that my clients did not have to wait long periods in queues. 
After he explained how it worked I agreed… My business grew much fast and I decided to 
sell perfumes and jewellery and I am making even more money than I did before. Now I 
am planning to expand to other neighbourhoods…125. 
 
An interesting difference seems to exist between these two respondents. While the first did 
not specify where he got the money to start the business, he shows that he had been 
struggling before entering a credit relationship with a formal lender. From the second, it is 
clear she got the money from her bother, probably interest free, and more importantly that 
when she entered the credit relationship she was not credit constrained. A lesson can be 
leant from this: that less credit constrained borrowers generally do better than the credit 
constrained ones and probably explains why the moderate poor have much more access to 
credit than the poor. 
 
In the main, however, it was common even among the clients who seemed to do well in 
their businesses, to complain about how difficult it is to do business in Beira, citing things 
like poor infrastructure, lack of systemic business support programmes, low levels of sales 
due to low incomes and the rising prices of commodities, all of which fall outside the 
ambit of lending institutions. 
 
All in all, the lending practices of the two institutions, particularly their emphasis on 
financing existing businesses, and their seriousness with repayment, ensures that clients 
                                                 
125 Interview with Joaninha, client from institution B 
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use the money to generate income126 without which their livelihoods would be negatively 
affected. Furthermore, the technical support which the institutions give to their clients 
underscores their intentions to help clients improve their income generating capacity. What 
seems to hinder the growth and development of small businesses is the economic 
environment in which they operate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 There instances when clients actually use the money for consumption, the institutions are not concerned 
with the use to which the money is put but generally with repayments 
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7. CONCLUSION 
This study concludes that the two institution and some of the poor, particularly the active 
clients, are engaged in a close long-term relationship. The closeness of their institutions to 
the clients is evident in both physical and relationship terms. The institutions are located 
near their client base and maintain regular contact with their clients throughout the 
relationship, from marketing to repayment. Marketing is done directly through personal 
selling. This means that the institutions, through loan officers, market their products 
personally to individual clients. In the process, the loan officers take the opportunity to 
provide the potential clients with some financial education, including how to source 
external financing for their micro-enterprises. They also give them the confidence and 
encouragement to enter credit relationship with more reliable formal lenders, such as the 
loan officers’ respective institutions.   
 
The application process is simple and personalised, with the loan officers guiding the 
applicants through the process with a great deal of friendliness and professionalism. 
Rejections are done in a friendly way giving the rejected applicants hope to enter credit 
relationships in the future provided their work on the issues cited as having led to the 
rejection. 
 
All in all, in Beira, access to credit is still a huge problem for most poor people despite 
there being a considerable use of relationship lending. The problem is that lending in Beira 
is still very risky due to high levels of poverty, the absence of cost effective legal structures 
for dealing with defaults, a macroeconomic environment, which makes it difficult for 
micro-enterprises to get quick and substantial returns to investments and other constraining 
factors. The high levels of uncertainty and unpredictability in credit markets still force 
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lenders to be risk averse and some stick to traditional lending practices rather than the 
more risky relationship practices outlined in this research report. 
 
Traditional measures used for securing loans include requiring clients to pledge collateral 
and co-signers. The idea is that these will encourage clients to take their credit 
responsibilities more serious and consequently develop a culture to repay their loans and as 
such qualify to stay in the credit relationship for as long as necessary.  It is worth noting 
though that requiring collateral and co-signers impedes many people with a poor asset 
basis from entering credit relationships. Therefore, more innovative risk management 
mechanisms that do not impede the poor from entering credit relationships, nor expose the 
institution to greater losses from default could be further developed.  
 
Relationship lending, properly implemented,  is an important strategy for dealing with the 
poor particularly because the lenders and the borrowers engage in repetitive interaction 
which can result in the establishment of solid long term relationships between them. To 
ensure that they engage in repetitive interaction with their clients, the institutions employ a 
series of mechanisms to keep their clients in the programme. These mechanisms include: 
frequent repayment schedules, progressive lending, the improvement of loan terms and 
conditions with subsequent loans for well performing clients. Additionally, clients are 
encouraged to save with the respective institutions.  
 
Group lending is one mechanism that is employed elsewhere, it has the advantage that 
clients are not required to pledge any physical but social collateral and as such it increases 
the chances of many poorer clients benefiting from access to credit. Furthermore, it 
reduces lending costs such as screening costs since screening is done by the clients 
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themselves and fosters repayment since “group members have a reason to coax comrades 
out of arrears or even to repay their debts for them. Members may also act as mentors for 
each other (Schreiner, 2001, p.5-6).  
 
However, group lending or joint liability has its own problems, which have to do with the 
costs especially to the clients in terms of time for synchronous activities and having well 
performing clients pay for other people’s irresponsibility in case of default by one or more 
group member. Institutions like BancoSol combine both group and individual lending, 
giving clients the choice and catering for the various categories of clients who cam benefit 
from the advantages each of the lending method has.  
 
Lenders also need to take more risk by relaxing the rigid entry requirements to allow more 
people to have access to credit programmes. To compensate for this facility they could 
impose compulsory savings or the establishment of an emergency fund for which 
borrowers are required to contribute, just like in the case of the Grameen Bank where “…a 
payment of 0.5% of every unit borrowed by the clients [is channelled towards the fund]” 
(Khawari, 2004, p.23). According to Reinke (1996) others [lenders] tap local knowledge 
by requiring character certificates from local worthies who are compensated according to 
the performance of their flock (p.10).  
 
Other commonly used safeguards, which are less traditional and help foster access, 
relationship building and sustenance include:  progressive lending, frequent repayment 
schedules and auxiliary services.  Progressive lending entails the granting of smaller loans 
in the beginning with the promise of larger loans in the future depending on the risk profile 
of the client. This process helps lenders and borrowers get to know each other over time. 
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Frequent repayment schedules also have the same effect. It makes it easier for lenders to 
monitor clients and above all it ensures that lenders and borrowers are in constant contact, 
hence the development of close long-term relationships (de Aghion and Morduch 2000). 
All these risk management mechanisms can constitute critical safeguards against 
opportunism while facilitating the entrance of many credit constrained people into credit 
programmes. 
 
In terms of benefits, this study has come to the conclusion that relationships play an 
important role in credit programmes involving the target group that typically require small 
loans. Relationships can be considered to be cost-minimizing mechanisms based on 
repetitive interaction between lenders and clients.  This study has found that this repetitive 
interaction or close long-term relationship between lenders and borrowers is important for 
reducing lending related risks that have to do with asymmetric information.  
 
Further, by investing in building relationships with clients, institutions help form social 
capital skills that enable the target group gain access to increased flows of credit at a lower 
cost and at improved terms and conditions. Additionally, when lenders and borrowers are 
closely related, lending processes become more flexible, as the lenders can more easily 
predict and control the behaviour of the borrowers. When this happens clients get quick, 
easy and increased access to credit and other financial and non-financial services, which 
can render the use of relationship lending profitable and welfare improving. 
  
7.1 Summary of lessons learned 
• A long-term relationship is more valuable for both lenders and clients than a one-
off arm’s length transaction. Repeat borrowers are less expensive for the 
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institutions given those levels of supervision and monitoring for this group of 
clients is lower compared to those for first time or one off-borrowers. As such 
institutions should strive to retain their clients in order to be sustainable and 
produce greater social impact. 
 
• Establishing close long-term relationships with clients is good for both clients and 
lenders. It makes it easier for lenders to tailor loans and other services to individual 
demand, but more importantly to individual capacity and willingness to repay 
loans. Loan granting decisions are taken and communicated more quickly, saving 
lots of time and resources in the process. 
 
• While both lenders and borrowers play an important role in relationship lending, 
lenders bear most of the responsibility in the relationship building process, 
particularly because they are the ones making the decision whether to extent credit 
to applicants or not. 
 
• Dealing with clients in a personalised (one to one) way is instrumental for building 
and sustaining client lender relationships. This makes it easy for them to take each 
others concerns on board and they both benefit from the relationship.  
 
• When dealing with the target group, keeping entry requirements particularly the 
documentations as simple, flexible and realistic as possible is important for 
attracting and retaining clients in credit programmes hence the establishment of 
long-term relationships between lenders and borrowers.  
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• Providing quality services and support to clients is an important ingredient for 
relationship building and sustenance, and for the success of lenders. Client 
satisfaction and loyalty is displayed through clients’ testimonials or referrals and 
their commitment to their contractual obligations.   
 
• Greater emphasis on social mobilisation, transparency and communication is 
important for attracting and retaining the poor into credit relationships. Considering 
that the poor are risk averse, institutions need to make extra efforts to lure and 
retain them in the credit relationship. Findings from the study have shown that it is 
possible to attract client into a relationship through social mobilisation and keep 
them in the relationship by providing with quality services and support. However, 
levels of outreach are still low due to factors ranging from stiff entry requirements 
particularly the collateral and co-signer requirement.  
 
• When dealing with the poor, it is important to employ non-traditional mechanisms 
for managing risk and delinquency: these include, reduced collateral requirements, 
requiring clients to open savings accounts, frequent repayment schedules, short 
terms to maturity, small initial loan sizes, subsequent improvement in terms and 
conditions etc. Lenders can reach poorer clients by allowing loan officers to admit 
into credit programmes a small percentage of clients who do mot meet the 
requirements for entering credit relationships.  Grameen bank for example 
encourages each of its loan officers to include a beggar in their borrower portfolios, 
hence its reputation for sustainability and greater social impact.  
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• Training and mentoring programmes are as important as credit itself; as such 
lenders should develop integrated programmes that combine credit, savings, 
training and other services in order to produce greater results and social impact.  
 
• Relationship lending is not a solution to the problems of access to credit by the 
poor particularly because it is mostly those already in the credit programmes who 
enjoy the benefits of long-term relationships with lenders.  Access to credit is still a 
huge problem, because most of the poor can not meet most of the requirement for 
entering credit programmes; as such there is need for other programmes such as 
safety nets to help the poorest of the poor rise to a level they can afford to enter 
credit programmes. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix –I Outreach indicators for institution A 
 
OUTREACH INDICATORS FOR INSTITUIONS “A” FOR THE PERIOD 2000-2005 
Outreach indicators 
 
31/12/05 31/12/04 31/12/03 31/12/02 31/12/01 31/12/00 
Number of Personnel 268 
 
210 173 130 n/a n/a 
Number of active borrowers 15,587 11, 350 8, 178 7, 277 3, 168 301 
Average loan Balance per 
borrower (US$) 531 
608 357 287 253 358 
Loans below US$300 n/a 
 
42.50% 44.42% 59.48% 0.00% 27.00% 
Woman borrowers 41.10% 
 
43.70% 52.60% 61.80% 55.20% 49.80% 
Average loan balance for 
borrower/GNI per Capita 
n/a 243.13% 169.84% 143.62% 126.63% 170.24%
Number of savers 41,648 
 
22, 954 16,125 7,990 296 n/a 
Average loan balance per saver 
(US$) 
127 156 133 101 103 n/a 
Average saving balance for 
saver/GNI per Capita 
n/a 62.37% 63.53% 50.70% 51.25% n/a 
Source: MixMarket 
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Appendix –II  Financial indicators for institution A 
 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR INSTITUTION “A” FOR THE PERIOD 2000-2005 
Financial information in 
US$ 31/12/05 31/12/04 31/12/03 31/12/02 31/12/01 31/12/00 
Balance sheet 
Gross loan portfolio 8,279,743 6,898,665 2,916,745 2,090,196 802,309 107,611 
Total assets 10,989,578 10,686,872 4,562,544 2,977,837 1,486190 1,514,282 
Savings  5,301,792 3,579,124 2,151,152 810,107 30,341 0 
Total equity 2,781,770 3,816,742 2,179,471 958,869 1,120,138 1,380,311 
Financial Structure 
Capital/ Asset Ratio 25.31% 35.71% 47.77% 32.20% 75.37% 91.15% 
Debt/Equity Ratio 295.06% 180.00% 109.34% 210.56% 32.68% 9.71% 
Deposits to loans 64.03% 51.88% 73.75% 38.76% 3.78% 0.00% 
Deposit to total assets 48.24% 33.49% 47.15% 27.20% 2.04% 0.00% 
Gross loan portfolio/Total 
assets 75.34% 64.55% 63.93% 70.19% 53.98% 7.11% 
Overall Financial Performance 
Return no Assets -2.45% 1.99% -7.52% -6.35% -5.21% n/a 
Return on Equity -8.03% 5.06% -18.07% -13.64 -6.25% n/a 
Operational self-
sufficiency  94.34% 103.81% 85.99% 88.62% 79.17% 14.41% 
Revenues 
Financial revenue Ratio 40.75% 54.22% 46.16% 49.49% 19.80% n/a 
Profit Margin -6.00% 3.67% -16.29% -12.84% -26.32% -594.0% 
Expenses 
Total Expense Ratio 43.19% 52.23% 53.69% 55.84% 25.02% n/a 
Financial Expense Ratio 6.34% 5.68% 9.22% 12.21% 0.61% n/a 
Loan Loss Provision 
Expense Ratio 1.45% 3.67% 2.75% 3.48% 1.59% n/a 
Operating expense Ratio 35.40% 42.87% 41.71% 40.15 22.82% n/a 
Efficiency  
Operating Expense/Loan 
Portfolio 50.56% 66.60% 62.82% 61 n/a n/a 
Cost per Borrower 284.9 334.8 203.5 171.6 197.4 n/a 
Productivity 
Borrowers per Staff 
member 58 54 47 56 n/a n/a 
Savers per Staff member 155 109 93 61 n/a n/a 
Risk 
Portfolio at Risk>30 days 
Ratio 1.81% 3.38% 2.17% 2.14% 0.53% n/a 
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 5.02% 5.26% 2.16% 1.83% 3.42% 3.36% 
Risk coverage Ratio 277.24% 155.34% 99.53% 85.37% 638.40% n/a 
Write Off Ratio 1.26% 0.54% 1.58% 0.22% n/a n/a 
 
Source: MixMarket 
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Appendix -III Outreach indicators for institution B 
 
OUTREACH INDICATORS FOR INSTITUTION “B” FOR THE PERIOD 2000-2005 
Outreach indicators 31/12/05
 
31/12/04 31/12/03 31/12/02 31/12/01 31/12/00 
Number of Personnel 134 
 
97 77 71 54 65 
Number of active borrowers 6,377 5,861 5,931 5,485 2,904 1,742 
Average loan Balance per 
borrower (US$) 
838 711 332 270 223 365 
Loans below US$300 n/a n/a 
 
n/a 26.80% 31.70% 30.00% 
Woman borrowers 58.48% 53.00% 
 
53.00% 52.00% 52.00% 51.80% 
Average loan balance for 
borrower/GNI per Capita 
n/a 284.53% 158.21% 135.02% 111.25% 173.87%
Number of savers 3.172 420 
 
0 0 0 0 
Average loan balance per saver 
(US$) 
254 132 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Average saving balance for 
saver/GNI per Capita 
n/a 52.82% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Source: MixMarket 
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Appendix -IV Financial indicators for institution B 
 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR INSTITUTION “B” FOR THE PERIOD 2000-2005 
Financial information in US$ 31/12/05 31/12/04 31/12/03 31/12/02 31/12/01 31/12/00 
Balance sheet       
Gross loan portfolio 5,345,830 4,169,153 1,970,572 1,481,185 646,154 636,036 
Total assets 8,061,544 5,481,744 3,291,247 2,106,224 923, 385 982,020 
Savings 806,929 55, 465 0 0 0 0 
Total equity 2,913,900 1,920,868 1,241,729 932,902 134, 771 116,055 
Financial Structure 
Capital/ Asset Ratio 36,15% 35.04% 37.73% 44.29% 14.60% 11.82% 
Debt/Equity Ratio 176,66% 185.38% 165.05% 125.77% 585.15% 746.17% 
Deposits to loans 15,09% 1.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Deposit to total assets 10,01% 1.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Gross loan portfolio/Total 
assets 
66,31% 76.06% 59.87% 70.32% 69.98% 64.77% 
Overall Financial Performance 
Return no Assets 0,71% 1.83% 7.45% -2.30% 3.12% n/a 
Return on Equity 1,99% 5.07% 18.50% -6.53% 23.70% n/a 
Operational self-sufficiency  103,52% 111.07% 126.69% 100.41% 108.49% 87.89% 
Revenues       
Financial revenue Ratio 41,89% 52.76% 50.38% 46.67% 39.89% n/a 
Profit Margin 3,40% 9.97% 21.07% 0.41% 7.82% -13.78% 
Expenses 
Total Expense Ratio 40,46% 47.50% 39.77% 46.48% 36.77% n/a 
Financial Expense Ratio 8,02% 4.775 6.45% 5.94% 0.94% n/a 
Loan Loss Provision Expense 
Ratio 
1,93% 1.75% 1.64% 3.00% 1.56% n/a 
Operating expense Ratio 30,51% 40.97% 31.68% 37.55% 34.27% n/a 
Efficiency  
Operating Expense/Loan 
Portfolio 
43,43% 58.55% 49.53% 53.47% 50.92% n/a 
Cost per Borrower 337,7 304.8 149.8 135.6 140.5 n/a 
Productivity 
Borrowers per Staff member 48 60 77 77 54 27 
Savers per Staff member 24 4 0 0 0 0 
Risk 
Portfolio at Risk>30 days 
Ratio 
0,69% 0.36% 0.30% 0.07% 0.30% 0.32% 
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 2,40% 2.22% 2.02% 2.46% 3.68% 3.04% 
Risk coverage Ratio 347% 620.81% 664.35% 3,455.11% 1,239.60% 963.64% 
Write Off Ratio 1,85% 1.27% 2.36% 2.46% 0.64% n/a 
       
Source: MixMarket 
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Appendix –VI Interview questions 
 
The interview questions (which were semi-structured) sought to explore the following 
issues: 
 
• Whether the lenders and the target group are engaged in short or long-term credit 
relationships-judged by levels of repeat borrowing and incentive structures to keep 
clients in the credit programmes 
• Whether target groups have been sensitized about, and that the target groups 
actually understand, the benefits and potential risks of taking loans 
• Whether target groups are acquainted with the bureaucratic and procedural 
exigencies they need to follow to obtain loans and repaying them  
• Whether the clients find the institutions useful and affordable, and are interested in 
taking loans from the same institutions repetitively for a long period or are just 
interested in a one off loan 
• Whether the target groups understand that in order for the institutions to be at their 
service in the long-term they need to run at a profit and that their repayment 
behaviour is important for the sustainability of the institutions.  
• Whether the target groups feel that the institutions and the loan officers are 
receptive, helpful and friendly enough in dealing with them and responding to their 
needs 
• Whether they feel that the institutions are not only concerned with making profits 
but also with their wellbeing, 
• Whether credit products respond to the needs of the target groups and they actually 
have a say in the establishment of terms and conditions 
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• Whether there is an improvement in terms and conditions for well performing 
clients 
• How much the institutions value profit making and how they balance the need for 
profit and lending to the poor 
• What the institutions do to ascertain that lending does not lead to high default rates 
and indebtedness 
• What the institutions do to make credit more accessible while ensuring repayment 
• What the institutions do to encourage repayment, increase borrower portfolio and 
keep well performing clients in the programmes for a long time. 
• What the clients do to assure that they have permanent access to credit programmes 
• Whether the institutions keep in touch with potential clients  and active  clients 
before and after loans are disbursed, not only to monitor creditworthiness and the 
use to which loans are put, but also to assist borrowers by responding quickly and 
un-bureaucratically to changes in the market 
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Appendix -VII List of interviewees 
 
Name of 
interviewee 
MFI to which the 
interviewee 
belongs 
The activity 
(business) done by 
the interviewee 
Place of 
interview 
Date of the 
interview 
Abilio A Sells food and drinks Business 
Premises 
09/01/06 
Amelia None Hair Saloon Home 05/10/2006 
Borris A Senior officer office 08/02/2006 
Caetono B Carpenter Home 15/02/2006 
Carlos B Senior officer Office 30/01/2006 
Castigo B Buys and sells goats B. Premises 10/02/2006 
Chicamisse A Buys and sells cereals B. Premises 30/01/2006 
Chipanela None Sells drinks and food Home 09/10/2006 
Chitima A Sells Vegetables B. Premises 06/02/2006 
Cufa B Repairs bicycles  B. Premises 09/01/2006 
Garicai A Loan officer Office 12/01/2006 
Joana A General retailer B. Premises 07/02/2006 
Joaninha B Has a hair saloon  B. Premises 10/02/2006 
Joao B Sells building material B. Premises 07/02/2006 
Jone None Sells parts B. Premises 09/10/2006 
Laise A Makes and sells pots B. Premises 18/01/2006 
Lorenco A Runs a canteen Home 30/01/2006 
Luisa B Loan officer Office 03/02/2006 
Maita A Sells food and drinks Home 20/01/2006 
Marcos B Sells fish B. Premises 09/01/2006 
Marta None Tailor B. Premises 11/10/2006 
Memba B Sells parts B. Premises 19/01/2006 
Miguel A Loan officer Home 16/02/2006 
Muti A Sells second hand cloths B. Premises 18/01/2006 
Nkala B Sells meat Home 26/01/2006 
Pedro B Runs a small shop B. Premises 31/01/2006 
Pita None Sells building materials B. Premises B 12/10/2006 
Rosa B Loan officer Office 03/02/2006 
Tatenda A Brews home made bear B. Premises 26/01/2006 
Tichaona A Runs a small shop B. Premises 08/02/2006 
Wadzanai A Tailor  B. Premises 18/01/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
